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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
According to popular understanding, America rose to the forefront of the international 
system when the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989) marked the end of the Cold War era singling 
America out as the world‟s only superpower. However, although no serious scholar whatever 
his/her background dares underestimate the significance of the Cold War and the bipolar 
nature of the international system during this four-decade phase of history, America‟s share 
of the global economy actually reached its peak during the 1950s in the midst of the Cold 
War and shortly following the end of the Second World War. Ever since then, it is a matter of 
fact that America‟s share of the global economy has been gradually declining, as confirmed 
by a multitude of indicators.   
 
In the 1970s, in the wake of the abandonment of the Gold Standard (1971), the oil crisis and 
ensuing stagflation that followed in the American economy (1973), and America‟s failure in 
the Vietnam War (1975), numerous scholars, most notably Charles Kindleberger, argued that 
America has entered a phase of hegemonic decline. Throughout the 1980s and thereafter, 
those views on American decline have been shared by various scholars from different 
backgrounds, most notably hegemonic stability theorists, classical and neo- realists and 
world-systems theorists. However, other scholars refuted this assertion claiming, albeit for 
different reasons, that American power is actually stable if not increasing.  
 
As such, as the Cold War drew to an end, the real debate in the international relations, 
political economy and economic history literature, pertaining to American power, was not 
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whether America was ascending to hegemony but rather whether it was descending from it. 
The major proponents of American decline include Charles Kindleberger, Stephan Krasner, 
Robert Gilpin, Robert Keohane, Immanuel Wallerstein and Paul Kennedy; faced by 
opposition from the likes of Susan Strange, Bruce Russet and Joseph Nye, who assert that 
American hegemony remains stable. 
 
The „declinists‟ mainly argue (a) that America‟s share of the world‟s wealth and power have 
declined and are continuing to decline from their 1950s levels, (b) that America is suffering 
from huge trade and budget deficits, and (c) that it is suffering from imperial overstretch. 
Their rivals, conversely, argue (a) that America‟ share of the global economy has declined 
relative to other economic powers mainly as a result of the reinvigoration of Western Europe 
and Japan after the end of the Second World War (actually an American foreign policy 
objective during the Cold War) and lately as a result of the growth of developing country 
economies (especially China), (b) that America continues to retain significant forms of power 
(„structural power‟ and (potentially) „soft power‟) even though its power resources might 
have relatively declined, and (c) that there is no clear challenger to American hegemony, as 
Europe lacks the will, and China and Russia the ability, to challenge America, at least on the 
short to medium term.  
 
Major events on the international political and economic arenas, such as the fall of the Berlin 
Wall (1989), the liberation of Kuwait by an American-led international coalition in the 
Second Gulf War (1991), the September 11
th
 attacks (2001), the American nearly unilateral 
invasion of Iraq (2003), and most recently the financial meltdown in the American economy 
3 
 
(2008), have sparked renewed interest in this debate, whether in the direction of adding 
confidence in the longevity of America‟s hegemony or in the opposite direction of increasing 
anxiety over America‟s predicament. 
 
Undoubtedly, the financial crash of 2008, which hit the American economy very hard, has 
renewed interest in the topic. Although, as events unfolded, the United States recovered 
faster than many expected, the financial meltdown serves as a reminder that America‟s 
power, which is founded on a vibrant economy, is more volatile than what is sometimes 
generally assumed, much like the September 11
th
 attacks highlighted America‟s vulnerability 
in the security realm. 
 
From the empirical standpoint, the declinists‟ assertion that America‟s share of the global 
economy, relative to those of other actors, is declining from its 1950s level is true; and this is 
a general pattern that does not relate to any particular financial crisis. However, the real 
problem that this research attempts to analyze is determining the effect, if any, said relative 
decline in America's power base has had, and continues to have, on America's actual power 
in the international system and global economy.  
 
Determining whether or not American power is on the decline is of paramount importance in 
formulating a clear understanding of international relations and the global economy for 
numerous reasons, and mainly because, according to declinist literature, (a) American 
hegemonic decline explains instability in the global economy and calls for predicting even 
greater instability, and (b) American decline, and more particularly American anxiety over 
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decline, is most likely going to result in a serious challenge to American hegemony and 
hence to instability in the international system, if not a great power war or the collapse of the 
international system as we know it.  
 
Conversely, if the assumption that American power is declining is refuted, then (a) the causes 
of instability in the international system and global economy must be explained in a different 
manner, and most likely in light of American policies which create, and sometimes willingly, 
such instability, and (b) the predictions of the disintegration of American hegemony and/or 
the international system must be called into question.  
 
It is also important to understand that the debate between the declinists and their opponents is 
not merely theoretical, as it is also a debate over American policy and, especially, the 
directions the U.S. should take in formulating its foreign policy. The belief in the decline of 
American power is, more often than not, used as a pretext for the unilateralism and/or 
isolationism needed to avoid such decline, while confidence in the longevity of American 
hegemony calls for more American openness and responsibility to the world.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
There are several important theoretical approaches to the question of hegemony and 
power in the international system and global economy, most notably hegemonic stability 
theory which focuses on the interplay between hegemony and global economic stability, Paul 
Kennedy‟s “realist” approach to the history of international relations emphasizing on patterns 
for the rise and fall of great powers, and Immanuel Wallerstein‟s “systemic” approach which 
is more focused on patterns in the international system as a whole. 
 
A. HEGEMONIC STABILITY THEORY AND ITS REVISIONS AND CRITICISMS 
 
Any discussion of American power, or potential hegemonic decline, cannot ignore the 
rich literature on the theory of hegemonic stability, which in fact is the dominant discourse 
on the issue. Perhaps, David Lake‟s remarks on this theory best describe it as an attempt to 
explain “periods of relative international openness” through the “existence of a single 
dominant economic power”.1 
 
Two of the earliest proponents of this theory are Robert Gilpin and Stephan Krasner, who 
both stress that “hegemony is prerequisite to the emergence of a liberal trade regime”.2 
According to Arthur Stein, Gilpin‟s approach is based on the argument that a hegemon‟s 
power is based on economic efficiency (therefore guaranteeing it the most gains from free 
trade) and political/military power (resources used to induce or coerce others into adopting 
                                                 
1
 Lake 1991, 106. 
2
 Stein 1984, 357. 
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free trade).
3
 In other words, only a hegemonic power is in a position whereby free trade is 
both desirable and achievable. 
 
An example of Gilpin‟s approach is how he stresses that multinational corporations, far from 
being a threat to American hegemony, exist because the United States has created the 
“necessary political framework” that enabled the “technological” and “economic” factors that 
brought them into existence to operate, and his subsequent conclusion that this 
predominantly “American phenomenon” would seize to “reign over international economic 
relations” if American power is challenged.4 
 
Another important figure in the development of this theory is Charles Kindleberger. One of 
the main issues he brings forward is the differentiation between the concepts of “leadership” 
(legitimized through “persuasion” rather than “domination”) and that of “coercion / 
exploitation” as the central theme of hegemony.5 He also argues that the international system 
during the period of American hegemony, although organized through “international 
institutions” on the surface, was in fact maintained through American leadership.6 In 
addition, Kindleberger emphasizes the merits of “benevolent despotism”, and stresses on the 
huge costs (“undue share of burdens of international public good”, to use his words) to the 
hegemon of maintaining such benevolence, and the difficulty to resist the temptation to move 
                                                 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Stein 1984, 404-19. 
5
 Kindleberger 1976, 31-4. 
6
 Ibid. 
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towards “illegitimate” and “exploitative” dominance, leading to the loss of leadership in the 
process.
7
 
 
An important distinction, however, needs to be made between Gilpin and Krasner on the one 
hand and Kindleberger on the other hand. The latter emphasizes the “provision of the 
collective good of international stability” as the main foundation of the causal relationship 
between hegemony and stability, whereas the first two add the creation of an “international 
regime” fulfilling the “security needs” (social stability, political power, and economic 
growth) of nations, particularly the hegemon, as another explanatory variable.
8
 Consequently, 
Kindleberger‟s definition of the international economic structure takes only one dimension 
(relative economic size of actors) into account while the other two consider political-military 
elements as well upon examining the distribution of global economic power.
9
  
 
In spite of their minor differences, the majority of hegemonic stability scholars are of the 
view that there are two main historical episodes of hegemony: the Pax Britannica period of 
the mid-nineteenth century and the Pax Americana period of the mid-twentieth century.
10
 
They also share a belief that American hegemony is steadily declining, and use the changes 
in the global political economy of the 1970s decade, especially Dollar devaluation, as 
evidence to support this argument.  
 
                                                 
7
 Kindleberger 1976, 35-8. 
8
 Lake 1991, 145. 
9
 Ibid. 
10
 Krasner 1976, 332. 
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Actually, the hegemonic stability theory did not arouse much interest before the events of the 
early 1970s drew scholarly attention to the topic. As David Rapkin puts it, only when 
hegemonic decline became plausible did this discourse become fashionable.
11
 Since then, it 
has occupied a dominant position in the debate on American decline, rising in significance 
during periods of stagnation and whenever a challenge is deemed eminent or a challenger 
serious and retreating from the scene during eras of stability and vitality. And also since then, 
this approach has been subject to repeated revisions, reservations, and critiques, which need 
to be explored before the validity of its proponents‟ conclusions can be examined. 
 
One of the drawbacks of the hegemonic stability theory, highlighted by David Lake, is its 
rather superficial assumption of similarity among historical cases of hegemony, particularly 
Pax Britannica and Pax Americana, and accordingly the assumption of similar patterns of 
hegemonic decline. Lake argues that the processes of rise and decline are very different in the 
British and American cases. He, more importantly, emphasizes the different approach each of 
those hegemons had/has to promoting free trade: Great Britain‟s commitment to free trade 
under all circumstances, as opposed to the American policy of “reciprocity” employed 
through controlling access to the U.S. market coupled with America‟s willingness to exert 
pressure through its international power.
12
  
 
Moreover, Lake asserts that issues such as the “institutionalization of international economic 
regimes”, the “overlap between security and economic issues”, and the importance of 
“foreign direct investment”, all point to the fact that international economic liberalism will 
                                                 
11
 Rapkin 1990, 1. 
12
 Lake 1991, 114. 
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survive independent of American hegemonic decline, unlike its decay parallel to British 
decline.
13
 This is an example of the liberal response to the hegemonic stability theory. 
Liberals argue that international regimes have a life of their own, and therefore they conclude 
that the current global free trade regime can survive past American hegemony. 
 
In a rather clever endnote, Lake implies that simplistic readings of history can lead to the 
adoption of aggressive trade policies and isolationism.
14
 He recognizes that a dangerous 
correlation between theory and policy sometimes exists, whereby theory could very well be 
developed as a pretext for forwarding particular policies or strategies. Hence, he draws 
attention to the possibility of questioning the integrity of the hegemonic stability approach. 
 
Another major critique of the theory is that of Arthur Stein. He attacks one of its central 
foundations: the assumption that hegemonic powers are willing and able to establish an 
atmosphere of international liberalism. According to him, a hegemon might pursue an 
isolationist policy for domestic reasons (a factor completely overlooked or at least rarely 
visited in the hegemonic stability literature).
15
 Furthermore, he makes the intelligent point 
that the role of other players is usually ignored: on the one hand it is not easy to impose free 
trade upon them by the hegemon, and similarly, on the other hand, the hegemon‟s decline 
cannot automatically lead to a global isolationist environment (hegemons, after all, “can 
close only their borders, not those of others”).16 
 
                                                 
13
 Lake 1991, 118-9. 
14
 Ibid.  
15
 Stein 1984, 359. 
16
 Stein 1984, 386. 
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A few other scholars challenge the hegemonic stability approach through highlighting its 
deficiency as a universal explanation. For example, upon examining the changes in 
international economic regimes during the period 1967-1977, Robert Keohane, rather than 
presenting an outright criticism of the theory, argues that it is more meaningful in explaining 
changes in some issue areas compared to others. He claims that the decline in U.S. power 
during said period explains developments in the international oil regime better than the 
monetary regime, and much better than the trade regime.
17
 And, therefore, he calls for 
enhancing the theory by examining domestic factors and understanding its varying degree of 
applicability to different issues. 
 
Similarly, upon investigating the liberalization of free trade in nineteenth century Arabia, in 
an attempt to empirically test the theory, Fred Lawson, reaches the conclusion that the 
validity of this approach can largely be questioned on the grounds of lack of applicability to 
cases, in different temporal, and more importantly, regional contexts.
18
 He argues that 
structural frameworks like hegemonic stability should hold under empirical scrutiny, as their 
nature is supposedly global and all-encompassing. His findings suggest that, contrary to 
hegemonic stability expectations, trade liberalization in nineteenth century Arabia was a 
function of regional and global competition rather than hegemonic power.
19 
In addition, 
Lawson provides an alternative explanation for the cycles of trade openness and closure in 
the Arab region. He argues that British policy towards the region was dictated by a strategy 
of guaranteeing military and economic security that varied with time, depending on changes 
in British interests that were not always consistent with free trade. 
                                                 
17
 Keohane 1980, 154. 
18
 Lawson 1983, 320. 
19
 Lawson 1983, 330. 
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Accordingly, he reaches two main conclusions: (a) that hegemonic stability is a mainly 
Eurocentric rather than genuinely universal; and (b) that, in the light of the case he considers, 
a wider definition of hegemony, which tackles the hegemon‟s resource manipulation and not 
only the global distribution of capabilities, is required.  
 
Some other scholars outline major inherent flaws in the theoretical foundations of the 
hegemonic stability theory, arguing that free trade, as a „public good‟, cannot be outlined as 
the independent variable bringing about the desirability of international economic openness. 
For example, Peter Cowhey and Edward Long, propose “surplus capacity” as an alternative 
explanation. According to them, some nations experience excess production in a number of 
their key industrial sectors, as a result of going through periods of structural adjustment. 
They argue that during historical phases were several major economic powers simultaneously 
confront this problem, in a number of key industrial sectors, the likelihood of reaching tacit 
agreements on protection through bargaining increases.
20
 Alternatively, during other periods 
where this problem is less pervasive, the attractiveness of liberalizing trade is pronounced, 
and domestic interest groups are relatively ignored. Thus, they are of the view that “surplus 
capacity” better explains cycles of trade openness and closure compared to the simplistic 
assumption of a “public good” nature of free trade.  
 
Approaching the same issue, John Conybeare argues that free trade is not always a public 
good, or the best strategy to pursue by all states, particularly hegemonic powers. He holds the 
view that as a result of rivalries and inequalities, the extraction of rents from, and may be 
even the exploitation of, small powers, could dissuade major powers from opting for truly 
                                                 
20
 Cowhey and Long 1983, 162. 
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free trade (which in that case will be less rewarding).
21
 Conybeare, therefore, warns against 
the detrimental influence of apparently simplistic interpretations of the classical and neo-
classical free trade literature on the hegemonic stability discourse.
22
 Arguing along similar 
lines, Joanne Gowa claims that “security externalities” of decisions on whether or not to 
pursue free trade policies have to be put into consideration.
23
 She draws attention to the fact 
that the key role of security issues is largely left out of the hegemonic stability framework, 
although they are of paramount importance to trade liberalization.   
 
Two other major critics of the hegemonic stability theory, who both challenge some of its 
major underlying assumptions more directly, are Duncan Snidal and Bruce Russet. Snidal 
attacks the theory‟s postulation of an “equitable distribution of benefits” from international 
economic liberalism or, in short, the “publicness of cooperation”.24 He argues that hegemonic 
stability has benefited industrial nations and “sectoral” monopolies (such as oil-producing 
states) more than “Third and Fourth World states”.25  
 
Another point he makes is that the conclusions of those examining American decline mix up 
“decrease in order” and “decrease in American control over order”.26 Consequently, he 
argues that hegemonic decline (leading to decline in stability, as the theory would contend) 
might be remedied through “hegemonic cooperation”.27 Snidal basically claims that the 
“collective action” of a few major powers can preserve order and stability in the absence of 
                                                 
21
 Conybeare 1984, 13. 
22
 Ibid. 
23
 Gowa 1989, 308. 
24
 Snidal 1985, 315-6. 
25
 Ibid.  
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid. 
13 
 
hegemony. To put it differently, he is of the belief that a hegemonic class of major powers 
can possibly substitute the hegemonic power in playing a stabilizing role on the global 
economic scene. 
 
Russet comments similarly on the issue of benefit distribution, contending that in the 
American case of hegemony, the U.S. had a disproportionate share of the benefits from 
hegemony (not a disproportionate share of the burdens of its costs, as Kindleberger argues).
28
 
Building upon this, he argues that those gains (particularly, “cultural hegemony”) help the 
United States maintain its position on the international arena.
29
 According to him, cultural 
hegemony enables the U.S. to “control outcomes” without having to “exert overt control over 
others”.30 
 
All of those criticisms are valuable in outlining the weaknesses of the hegemonic stability 
theory, yet none of them (even Snider‟s and Russet‟s), cut to the heart of the matter, by 
attacking the core of this theory, which is exactly what Susan Strange does. To begin with, 
Strange is of the view that a “myth” of decline is used to create an atmosphere of pessimism 
and therefore isolationism, or apathy towards the thus deemed inevitable “lack of 
international cooperation and feebleness of international organizations”.31 More importantly, 
she argues that the rise and fall in the significance of this theory can only be understood as a 
manifestation of the outcome of the battle between “liberal” and “realist” trends in U.S. 
foreign policy, and therefore she claims that it becomes much more important in periods of 
                                                 
28
 Russet 1985, 208. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid. 
31
 Strange 1987, 552-4. 
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American “isolationism” and “unilateralism”, independent of whether American power is 
actually declining or not.
32
 Finally, she casts doubt on the causal relationship between 
economic instability and hegemonic decline, claiming that the truth of the matter is that 
American belief in the “myth” of decline (and not actual decline in American hegemony), 
un-innocently coinciding with periods of isolationist foreign policy, is itself an important 
cause of instability.
33
  
 
Of equal significance is Strange‟s critique of regime analysis (a major component of most 
theories of hegemonic stability). She actually highlights several drawbacks of this analytical 
approach, but the most important of those is her assertion that it represents a mere “shift of 
fashion”, if not American taste, regarding international relations.34 According to her, 
Americans “exaggerate the shocks of the 1970s”, portraying them as a loss of a previous 
stability coinciding with a decline in power.
35
 Moreover, she argues that this period reflects 
the domestic factor (decline in the willingness to intervene) more than the systemic factor 
(“significant change in the distribution of military or economic power”).36  
 
As for the decline in the American role in international organizations, she is of the view that 
the U.S. remains powerful in all “strategic” organizations” (those more meaningful to it in 
certain issue areas when compared to bilateral negations), only withdrawing control over 
                                                 
32
 Ibid.  
33
 Ibid.  
34
 Strange 1982, 479. 
35
 Strange 1982, 483-4. 
36
 Ibid.  
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“symbolic” organizations of no strategic weight such as the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).
37
 
 
Strange‟s criticism, in addition to various revisions and reservations, completely dispels the 
myth of hegemonic stability: the association of periods international economic stability and 
free trade with periods of hegemonic power. Empirically, the relation is weak and does not 
apply universally to all issue areas or regions. Theoretically, the degree of causality is even 
weaker. Yet, most importantly, there seems to be a devious connection between the 
hegemonic stability theory and American isolationist foreign policy, which casts doubt on 
whether this theory neutrally explains periods of isolation, or in truth, justifies them as they 
are instigated. Consequently, this must also cast doubt on whether American hegemonic 
decline, an inherent component of this discourse, can be seen in a similar light. In other 
words, the possibility that anxiety over hegemonic decline is a pretext for expansionist or 
aggressive American foreign policy cannot be ignored. 
 
  
                                                 
37
 Ibid.  
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B. KENNEDY‟S THEORETICAL APPROACH AND ITS CRITICISMS 
 
Another theoretical approach to the question of American hegemonic decline is that 
of Paul Kennedy. Writing just a couple of years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
Kennedy tackles American decline towards the end of his monumental work: “The Rise and 
Fall of the Great Powers”. To begin with, he identifies two major challenges to the 
“longevity” of any hegemonic power: (a) balancing between national security requirements 
and the material means of sustaining them; and (b) protecting “the technological and 
economic bases of its power from relative erosion in the face of the ever-shifting patterns of 
global production”.38 Faced with those challenges, he explains, the United States, like 
previous great powers, therefore suffers from “imperial overstretch”, as its international 
commitments are becoming exceedingly difficult to defend “simultaneously”.39 
 
Kennedy also makes the important observation that the U.S. “has roughly the same massive 
array of military obligations across the globe” as it had in the 1950s, “when its share of world 
GNP, manufacturing production, military spending, and armed forces personnel were so 
much larger”.40 This of course is a clear example of symptoms of relative decline in 
American power. However, it should be noted that there could be a significant time lag 
between changes in the various capabilities of major powers, and their subsequent translation 
into changes in the international system, bearing in mind that such time lag is indeed one of 
the most plausible explanations of how the United States was less-than-hegemonic during the 
                                                 
38
 Kennedy 1987, 514-5. 
39
 Ibid.  
40
 Kennedy 1987, 521.  
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Cold War when its economic and military capabilities suggested a more dominant role on the 
international arena.  
    
Moving on with his analysis, Kennedy identifies several specific challenges facing American 
hegemony: “budgetary constraints” and planning for a “variety of military contingencies” in 
the military realm, and relative industrial and agricultural decline, as well as running 
“staggering deficits”, in the economic realm.41 Using his understanding of previous historical 
cases of hegemonic decline, he thus foresees a U.S. suffering from having to meet “growing 
foreign challenges” that drain valuable resources, channeling them away from “productive 
investment”, and therefore ultimately resulting in “the downward spiral of slower growth, 
heavier taxes, deepening domestic splits over spending priorities, and a weakening capacity 
to bear the burdens of defense”.42 
 
Finally, Kennedy argues that the extraordinarily huge American share of world wealth and 
power, which reached forty percent by the end of the Second World War due to peculiar 
“historical and technical circumstances” was, is, and must continue to be, in decline until it 
reaches a more “natural” size of less than twenty percent, which would correspond to the 
actual “geographic extent, population, and natural resources of the United States”.43 
However, he asserts that the U.S. is still probably going to play an important role in the 
multipolar world he expects to emerge in the future, simply because of its sheer size.
44
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Commenting on Kennedy‟s work, George Modelski begins by challenging his criteria for 
measuring hegemony that are solely based on notions of relative capabilities of power and 
wealth. Modelski argues that other sources of hegemony outside of this realm, such as 
identity, knowledge, and legitimacy (an important factor according to Kindleberger), cannot 
be ignored. Of course this line of argument is very similar to the aforementioned “cultural 
hegemony” concept introduced by Russet.45  
 
Citing the previous example of British hegemony, Modelski argues that the same hegemonic 
power can experience several phases of leadership, if the sources for its hegemony change.
46
 
Therefore, he argues that even if relative decay of material capabilities occurs, decline does 
not become inevitable because this can be remedied if other sources of leadership exist. With 
this in mind, he claims that a world-wide process of democratization can provide and is 
providing a new basis for an American hegemonic role. Contending that that such a process 
of undeniable magnitude, embedded in a larger process of globalization of norms, is 
currently reshaping international relations in a very significant way, he argues that the United 
States is on its way to another period of hegemony because it is the most equipped power on 
the global scene to manage such a sweeping change.
47
  
 
He also considers some other factors that can possibly bring about such an extension of 
American hegemony. For example, he asserts that in the absence of serious challengers in the 
near future (whether a united Europe, Japan, or China), and with the possibility of major 
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power war diminished as a result of the advent of nuclear power, alternative scenarios are 
indeed limited.
48
  
 
Therefore, Modelski, unlike Kennedy, believes that hegemonic decline is a remote 
possibility, given that the process of democratization, amongst other factors, will provide the 
United States with a new basis for a hegemonic role. Actually, this argument has been 
presented by several other scholars, who do not necessarily have a similar perspective on the 
matter, yet acknowledge the huge role a global democratization process can play in 
reasserting American leadership.  
 
One such scholar is William Robinson, who argues that as forces of globalization swept the 
planet, American policy makers became increasingly aware of the drawbacks of tolerating, 
accommodating, and in fact sometimes even promoting authoritarianism, which became an 
inefficient mode of preserving global order. Accordingly, “polyarchy” (far from the true 
nature of substantive democracy) became a more useful means to attain the same American 
goals of simultaneously asserting hegemony and maintaining the world system of production 
and distribution.
49
 For very different reasons, Robinson is, therefore, also of the belief that 
„pseudo-democratization‟ (a change in cultural and ideological discourse) can propel 
America into a new phase of hegemony. 
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Writing in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War and the Second Gulf War, Lea 
Brilmayer, also asserts the importance of democratization in providing a basis for American 
hegemony. Holding the view that a moral justification for a hegemonic role is necessary, she 
claims that the establishment of a “new world order” on the premise of globalizing 
democracy provides a much-needed justification for a sustained American role on the global 
arena.
50
 
 
As such, several scholars (whether long-cycle theorists, neo-dependency theorists, or 
liberals) share the view that some form of democratization can serve as an important source 
of continued American hegemony. Such a view can challenge Kennedy‟s conclusion, if 
hegemony is not merely defined as relative capabilities, and other factors contributing to 
cultural hegemony, such as ideology, identity, and legitimacy, are considered. 
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C. WALLERSTEIN AND THE WORLD SYSTEMS APPROACH 
 
Employing a world systems approach, Terence Hopkins and Immanuel Wallerstein 
reach the same widely held conclusion, of American hegemonic decline. They begin their 
analysis by asserting two important points: (a) that hegemony is a brief phase in the life of 
the interstate system, and (b) that the U.S enjoyed such a position of power in a “world-
economy” and not a “world-empire”, starting from 1945.51 Then, they argue that this 
American hegemony in the “world-system” began to decline during the period of 1967-73, 
marking a movement into a new area of a long hegemonic cycle that started from 1873, 
parallel to a transition from an “expansion A-phase” to a “contraction B-phase” in a shorter 
Kondratieff cycle pronounced through the deceleration in the pace of “global economic 
expansion”.52 Therefore, they conclude that this period was the climax of those two 
intersecting “cyclical curves”, while contending that it might also be the pinnacle of another 
longer curve: the life of the “modern world-system”.53 
 
Whether or not this particular pattern of movement along those three cyclical curves actually 
took place is not our primary concern, yet the arguments Hopkins and Wallerstein use to 
prove and/or explain American hegemonic decline are extremely useful, especially as 
Kennedy focuses on a universal explanation of the phenomenon of hegemonic decline and 
understands the decline in American hegemony within the context of his framework for “The 
Rise and Fall of the Great Powers”. And, also because although universal explanations, such 
as Kennedy‟s, are sometimes useful, they cannot fully account for how certain phenomena 
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occur in certain ways at certain times (in other words, universality sometimes limits the 
capacity for appreciating or even understanding the particular).  
 
Wallerstein maintains that U.S. hegemony grew steadily for about a quarter of a century after 
the Second World War, insisting that the “noisy in rhetoric” Cold War was a deviation from 
a realization of the fact the Soviet Union “did not have anything near the productive strength 
of the USA”.54 He explains how U.S. hegemony was challenged by the events of the 1967-73 
period, first through the “growth in strength of other states in the core zone” such as 
Germany and Japan, and then through the weakening of American “financial leverage” with 
the surfacing of “EuroDollars” (Dollars outside direct American financial control due to their 
location in Europe) and the contraction of U.S. gold reserves leading to the ending of the 
“gold standard”.55  
 
One of the focal points of this theoretical approach is the so-called world economic crisis of 
the early 1970s. This generally refers to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, whereby 
the American role was basically one of providing the world with a „central bank‟, by printing 
Dollars as a source of international liquidity and tying up gold reserves to ensure Dollar 
convertibility to gold (the so-called gold standard). This meant running balance-of-payments 
deficits and depleting gold reserves, something the United States could not of course tolerate 
indefinitely. In addition, as foreign Dollar reserves exceeded American reserves, and the 
phenomenon of EuroDollars (Dollars in European banks) emerged, it became clear that 
                                                 
54
 Wallerstein 1996, 215-6. 
55
 Wallerstein 1996, 218. 
23 
 
American financial power decreased. Therefore, in 1971, the U.S. suspended the gold 
standard and the world economy shifted from fixed to floating exchange rates.  
 
While, this is a clear sign of some decline in American financial clout, nevertheless its 
significance is somewhat exaggerated. Indeed, the whole issue is seriously blown out of 
proportion when it is claimed that it marks the beginning of the decline phase in American 
hegemony. This is particularly the case, given the fact that some scholars interpret those 
events, as the outcomes of a conscious grand American strategy to reaffirm its global 
leadership, albeit on different grounds. 
 
Some scholars are of the view, that the U.S., increasingly aware of the limitations of its 
economic leverage, set out to establish a new basis for a less visible (compared to the two 
decades after the Second World War) yet equally meaningful hegemony or, according to 
them, a new world order.
56
 They argue that the abolition of the gold standard, the devaluation 
of the Dollar, the rise in oil prices, and the global inflation that ensued, were all components 
of a deliberate American policy instigated to forward America‟s interests vis-à-vis its main 
competitors, and breakaway from the unnecessary international commitments slowing down 
its economic growth.
57
 Those scholars claim, for instance, that inflation was less pronounced 
in the U.S. than in Western Europe and Japan, where energy dependency exposed the 
economic vulnerability of those economies compared to the more self-sufficient American 
economy. Additionally, they maintain that inflation had a positive effect on the 
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competitiveness of American firms, producing a favorable outcome on the balance of trade 
and the balance of payments.
58
  
 
Of course such an understanding is also as potentially simplistic as the hegemonic decline 
interpretations, and ignores that several events during this period were truly outside of 
American control. However, even if there was no deliberate American strategy involved, it is 
safe to conclude that the U.S. was not forced into relinquishing its extremely dominant role, 
as much as this was a voluntary choice. Moreover, it is equally plausible that the outcome of 
this period was a different form of American hegemony, and not a significant hegemonic 
decline.  
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D. AN ALTERNATIVE THEORETICAL APPROACH  
 
Each of the theoretical approaches examined in the preceding sections suffers from a 
major flaw: hegemonic stability theory‟s central premise of associating of periods stability 
and trade liberalization in the global economy with periods of hegemonic power does not 
hold against rigorous empirical and theoretical analysis, Kennedy‟s approach ignores aspects 
of hegemony such as legitimacy that transcend assessments of relative capabilities, and the 
world systems approach significantly exaggerates the economic shocks of the 1970s to reach 
very far reaching conclusions about the history, present and future of international relations 
and the global economy.  
 
1. Power vs. Power Resources 
 
A theoretical approach or framework that adequately addresses the complex nature of 
power and hegemony in the international system and global economy must avoid the attempt 
to come up with a grand theory that explains general patterns of history, as is the case with 
the abovementioned approaches, and begin with the more modest goal of formulating a clear 
understanding of what constitutes power in the international relations context, as there are 
many ways of defining and describing power in international relations. 
 
26 
 
According to John Mearsheimer, realists are of the view that state behavior is largely dictated 
by the material aspects of international affairs.
59
 This orthodox view of the realist perspective 
on power is somewhat simplistic.
60
 As a matter of fact, realists have a wider interpretation of 
power that does not limit power to the material realm. For example, Hans Morgenthau argues 
that: “power may comprise anything that establishes and maintains the power of man over 
man ... from physical violence to the most subtle psychological ties by which one mind 
controls another”.61 For Morgenthau, non-material aspects of power such as “a nation‟s 
character, morale and quality of governance” are very important.62 This is very evident in 
Morgenthau‟s following remark: “power …. tends to be equated with material strength, 
especially of a military nature, I have stressed more than before its immaterial aspects”.63 
 
Neo-realists, such as Kenneth Waltz, have a narrower conception of power.
64
 Waltz identifies 
the following components of power: “size of population and territory, resource endowment, 
economic capability, military strength, political stability and competence”.65 Even though 
Waltz does not ignore some non-material aspects such as political stability and competence, 
he obviously puts a lot more emphasis on the material aspects of power.
66
 The reason for the 
emphasis by neo-realists, such as Waltz, on material aspects of power is an outcome of their 
commitment to the so-called „scientific‟ realism, which limits them mainly to tangible 
elements that are easier to quantify.
67
 Therefore, although neo-realist tried to be more 
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„scientific‟ than classical realists or modern realists such as Morgenthau, it is the latter that 
had a wider and clearer understanding of power in the international relations context. 
 
On the other hand, British historian, Niall Ferguson, who is a neo-conservative, argues that 
power consists of (a) “… monopolizing as far as possible the means of projection (of power), 
which mainly include material things: guns, butter, people, money, oil”, or what one can call 
material sources of power; and (b) legitimacy and credibility, or what he calls “morale”.68 
Ferguson explains that the material sources of power are becoming more and more dispersed, 
to the extent that real power depends on legitimacy and credibility.
69
 In other words, 
Ferguson, much like the realists, identifies material and immaterial sources of power, and 
puts equal (if not more) emphasis on immaterial sources. 
 
However, perhaps the most accurate definition of power comes from the neo-liberal, Joseph 
Nye. According to him, power, simply put, is the ability to produce certain outcomes.
70
 Nye 
recognizes that power, defined as the ability to produce certain outcomes, is often associated 
with certain resources that magnify this ability such as population, territory, natural 
resources, economic strength, military force … etc., and one can also add credibility and 
legitimacy to this list.
71
  
 
He also adds that power is often inaccurately defined as the possession of those resources, 
even though those resources do not guarantee the achievement of desired outcomes in and of 
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themselves.
72
 Putting it rather brilliantly, he identifies those resources as the “high cards” is 
the “international game of poker”, and rightly argues that holding those high cards does not 
guarantee winning, if the “hand” is played poorly or if the player were to fall victim to 
“bluff”.73  
 
This distinction between power and the sources of power is also recognized by Susan Strange 
and Bruce Russet.
74
 Strange also notes that power, defined as the ability to control outcomes, 
cannot be measured empirically, while power, defined as the possession of the resources 
reinforcing this ability, can be measured through quantitative indicators.
75
 This explains why 
mistaking power for the sources of power is so commonplace in the international relations 
and political economy literature. 
 
With the above clear understanding of power and the distinction between power resources 
and power itself, the declinist argument that the decline in America‟s relative share of the 
global economy automatically means a decline in American power is potentially simplistic. 
For example, Paul Kennedy argues, in a very famous and controversial passage, that “… the 
geographical extent, population, and natural resources of the United States suggest that it 
ought to possess perhaps 16 or 18 percent of the world‟s wealth and power”, as opposed to 
the 45 percent or more it possessed by the end of the Second World War, and that we are 
currently witnessing the decline of this “extraordinary” share to a more “natural” share.76  
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This argument has been the subject of huge controversy, as many scholars have sought to 
explain the relative decline in America‟s share of the global economy from its 1950s level, 
by (a) sighting the so-called “Second World War effect” (unlike all the great powers, the 
United States was actually strengthened rather than weakened by the war), and (b) arguing 
that this phenomenon is better explained by the expansion of Japan and Western Europe to 
their “natural” size (the desirable result of a deliberate policy implemented by the United 
States to check Soviet influence during the Cold War) rather than the shrinkage of America 
to its “natural” size.77 Kennedy has actually rebutted this “Second World War effect” 
argument, claiming that evidence suggests that America‟s share of the global economy is 
declining to a level lower than its share in the late 1920s i.e. even prior to the Second World 
War.
78
  
 
This controversy is rather unconstructive because (a) the phrase “share of the world‟s 
wealth”, or share of global power resources to be more accurate, is unquantifiable i.e. there is 
no consensus on what indicators accurately measure this share, and (b) Kennedy is confusing 
the sources of power (“wealth” to quote him) and power itself, as he is consistently lumping 
“wealth” and “power” together. It is this confusion that leads Kennedy to make an even more 
controversial argument in claiming that “… even when it declines to occupy its “natural” 
share of the world‟s wealth and power, a long time into the future, the United States will still 
be a very significant Power in a multipolar world, simply because of its size”.79  
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The above argument demonstrates Kennedy‟s definition of power, as the possession of power 
resources. He assumes that when America‟s share in of the world‟s wealth (power resources) 
falls to 16 or 18 percent, this would automatically mean that the international system would 
become multipolar. First of all, the argument that the United States would ultimately shrink 
to this size is debatable. Far more importantly, the conclusion that this size will result in the 
United States being a great power among others is groundless. This need not be the case at 
all. America may still have hegemonic power, in the sense of possessing the ability to 
produce favorable outcomes in the international system, even if its power resources relatively 
shrink.  
 
To use Nye‟s example, if this shrinkage in America‟s resource base actually occurs, America 
may (a) still be holding “higher cards” than everyone else in the “international game of 
poker”, and (b) it may be playing better than everyone else even if its cards are not as high as 
they used to be. Therefore, if a distinction is made between the sources power and power 
itself, the real question becomes whether or not America has maintained its power, in spite of 
the relative decline in its power resources.    
 
2. Relational Power vs. Structural Power  
 
Power is best defined as the ability to produce desirable outcomes or to control 
outcomes. As such, power could mean the ability of a certain actor to get another actor to do 
something it would otherwise not do.
80
 Strange refers to this form of power as “relational 
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power” i.e. the power one actor possesses in relation to another actor.81 Strange argues that 
this form of power is losing its significance in international relations, as states are no longer 
competing for territory as much as they are competing for market shares.
82
 Of course this is 
not to say that force and military security are insignificant; however, the way in which they 
manifest themselves as sources of power has drastically shifted. Strange contrasts relational 
power with what she believes is the form of power relevant in today‟s world, namely, 
“structural power”. According to her, structural power is the ability to shape the structure of 
the global economy and international system and to set the global agenda.
83
 To use Nye‟s 
“international poker game” example, structural power would be the ability to dictate the rules 
of the game itself.  
 
Strange argues that structural power emanates from four sources, namely, (a) the ability to 
control the security of other actors, (b) the ability to control the system of production, (c) the 
ability to determine the structure of finance and credit, and (d) the ability to exert the most 
influence over knowledge.
84
 She claims that the United States still possesses a great deal of 
structural power understood as such.  
 
To begin with, America still dominates the NATO alliance, and it is particularly this 
asymmetry in the distribution of the security burden in the Western world that enables the 
United States to dictate the rules of the game vis-à-vis Europe.
85
 The same can also be said 
about America‟s role in guaranteeing the security of Japan. It is important to note that 
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Strange was making the above arguments before the end of the Cold War. The 
preponderance of American military power relative to all other significant economic powers, 
nevertheless, still remains quite undeniable nowadays.  
 
However, the crucial factor here is not American military power in its absolute sense, but 
rather whether this power is utilized to guarantee the security of the world‟s significant 
economic powers, giving the United States the kind of influence and leverage it had in the 
Cold War era. In this regard, an important question is how the replacement of the risk of 
Soviet dominance by other security challenges has affected America‟s structural power with 
respect to the security aspect. 
 
With regards to the ability to control the system of production, Strange rightfully argues, that 
in a globalized world dominated by „MNCs‟, it not America‟s share of production that 
matters but rather the share of American-based corporations.
86
 Writing in 1987, Strange 
observed that any list of the largest corporations in the world would be dominated by 
American-based corporations.
87
 This observation is still mostly true nowadays in spite of the 
recent troubles in the American economy, as validated empirically. 
 
It is with respect to the ability to shape the structure of finance and credit that Strange make 
her finest argument. She concludes, and rightly so, that the predominance of the U.S. Dollar 
has enabled America to run staggering deficits and remain largely unaffected. As such, those 
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deficits are a sign of America‟s dominance and not its weakness.88 The American dominance 
of financial markets, she argues, is evidenced by the domination of American banks and 
financial institutions, which hold a huge share of the world‟s bank assets.89  
 
Those arguments remain valid today, and the impact the meltdown in the American financial 
markets has had on the global economy suggests that America still dominates international 
financial markets. In any case, America‟s power in the financial markets should be examined 
in light of recent events to ascertain whether Strange‟s arguments in this regard are still valid. 
 
Finally, Strange argues that America is still able to exert the most influence over knowledge. 
Writing back in the late 1980s, she referred to America‟s domination of the fields of 
information technology and telecommunications
90
, which as the 1990s unfolded proved to be 
a remarkably accurate observation, as it was particularly those fields that propelled the 
American economy to staggering growth in the age of the Internet. Nowadays, evidence is 
aplenty of the remarkable influence America has on knowledge. American universities are 
still the highest rated in the world and the United States continues to dominate the Noble 
Prize, especially in natural sciences.      
 
3. Soft Power and Legitimacy 
 
Scholars from different backgrounds identify legitimacy as a crucial component of 
power and hegemony. Applying a neo-liberal approach to the matter, Joseph Nye coined the 
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term „soft power‟. He argues that power, defined as the ability to produce outcomes, can be 
achieved through coercion whether by “force or inducement” (i.e. “sticks” or “carrots”), or 
through “attraction” (or the “ability to shape what others want”).91 He labels power achieved 
through coercion “hard power”, as opposed to power achieved through attraction which he 
labels “soft power”.  
 
With respect to soft power, Nye warns against the confusion of sources of soft power such as 
an attractive culture or attractive political values (e.g. democracy and human rights), and soft 
power itself, which simply put is the possession of legitimacy and credibility.
92
 An important 
example Nye makes of the significance of soft power is his brilliant analysis of the so-called 
„War on Terrorism‟, the outcome of which he believes depends largely on the ability of the 
United States to attract moderate Muslims.
93
 In this particular case, the sources of America‟s 
soft power are perhaps not be found in its culture, but rather in the perceived legitimacy of its 
actions and policies, and it is particularly here where the Bush Administration has failed most 
miserably, especially by launching the Iraq invasion in 2003.  
 
Another approach to the factor of legitimacy and credibility with respect to power is the 
Gramscian approach. The starting point of this approach is recognizing the importance of 
nonmaterial normative bases of power, or in other words, acknowledging the fact that 
hegemony is usually based on „legitimate domination‟.94 Combining the arguments of Max 
Weber and legal positivists, in an international context, yields two conclusions: (a) that there 
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is a need to justify power through legitimacy; and (b) that legitimacy is usually conferred 
through upheld values and norms (dependant on cognitive factors).
95
  
 
This leads to the conclusion that consolidation of hegemonic power emanates from adherence 
to the normative framework or value structure forwarded by the hegemon.
96
 In this respect, 
Antonio Gramsci, stresses the importance of ideological control and consensus building in 
legitimizing domination through establishing desirable frames of reference.
97
 
 
According to him, there are three main types of hegemony: (a) integral hegemony where the 
hegemon is able to simultaneously satisfy its interest and the aspirations of the entire system; 
(b) declining hegemony where “acute contradictions” exist between the hegemon‟s interests 
and those of its subordinates; and (c) minimal hegemony where contradictions exist, yet 
subordinates are too weak to pose a challenge, and a high degree of consensus is still possible 
without coercion, particularly through “legitimate domination”.98 Along those lines, Alan 
Carfuny argues that Keynesianism provided the basis for American integral hegemony in the 
two decades following the Second World War, and that the global acceptance of the 
„Neoliberal Discourse‟ starting as of the 1990s allows America some measure of minimal 
hegemony. Therefore, the Gramscian approach suggests that the United States could still be 
able to preserve a minimal form of hegemony, through the legitimate domination of weak 
subordinates, owing to their acceptance of its normative values.
99
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Although the terms „soft power‟ and „legitimate domination‟, on the surface of things have 
very different connotations, both terms shed light on the importance of the factor of 
legitimacy in solidifying or eroding power. The question of whether or not America‟s 
legitimacy and credibility as hegemon is on the decline is therefore of crucial importance.  
 
Hence, perhaps the best approach to the question of examining America‟s power in 
international relations and the global economy is to assess the degree of structural power the 
U.S. enjoys coupled with an analysis of the factor of legitimacy and how it can cement or 
deplete such structural power to achieve American hegemony. This would be in line with 
Robert Cox‟s understanding of hegemony, in the international relations context, as a 
combination of material power, a normative image of world order and international 
institutions that appear to realize that order in a universal manner.
100
 In other words, Susan 
Strange‟s structural power approach can be used to have a better understanding of America‟s 
position in terms of material power in today‟s world; however, assessing how this material 
power, whatever its degree, can be translated into hegemony (as understood by Cox) would 
ultimately rest on how the U.S. can couple its raw material power with norms and institutions 
in order to achieve legitimate domination on the international arena.        
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III. AMERICA’S STRUCTURAL POWER  
 
A. AMERICAN SECURITY PROMINENCE 
 
According to Susan Strange, the first, and perhaps the foremost, source of structural 
power is the ability of the hegemon to control or effect the security of other actors. There are 
several means of empirically verifying America's prominence in the security realm especially 
vis-à-vis its allies, but perhaps the most telling measures of this prominence are (a) the sheer 
size of American military spending, and (b) the U.S. possession of superior military 
capabilities, especially compared to American allies (most notably, the advanced economies 
of Western Europe and the Far East, and the oil-rich Gulf states). 
 
With regards to military spending, the next table and figure illustrate the size of the military 
expenditure for the twenty highest military spending countries of the world. 
 
Table 1: Size of Military Expenditure in 2009 
 
Military Expenditure (US$ million at 2008 prices and 
exchange rates) 
 
Country 
663,255 United States                           
98,800 China             
69,271 United Kingdom            
67,316 France                         
61,000 Russia                         
48,022 Germany                        
46,859 Japan                          
39,257 Saudi Arabia                   
37,427 Italy                          
36,600 India                          
27,130 South Korea                   
38 
 
27,124 Brazil                         
20,564 Canada                         
20,109 Australia                      
19,409 Spain                          
19,009 Turkey                         
14,309 Israel                         
13,917 Greece                         
12,642 Netherlands                    
10,860 Poland                         
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) available on 
http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2009.xls 
 
Figure 1: Size of Military Expenditure in 2009 (in US$ million) 
 
 
 
As demonstrated above, as late as 2009, the United States was by far the largest military 
spender in the world, with a military expenditure that is almost an order of magnitude larger 
than that of China, its closest rival. Of particular significance is the fact that America has a 
military expenditure that is about ten times or higher that of its top military spending allies, 
such as the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Saudi Arabia, Italy and South Korea. 
This points out to the hegemonic nature of America‟s security relations with its allies, which 
seem to rely, at least in their military spending patterns, on America‟s providence of their 
security, whether in whole or in part.  
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The next table and figure illustrate the same pattern based on the data for the year 2000, 
revealing, that in terms of military spending, American dominance in the field of security has 
far from declined, and that it might have even increased over time, at least in recent years. 
 
Table 2: Size of Military Expenditure in 2000 
 
Country Military Expenditure (US$ million at 2008 prices and 
exchange rates) 
 
United States 377,228 
France 62,707 
United Kingdom                            54,055 
Germany 51,487 
Japan 47,496 
Italy 43,150 
China 31,200 
Russia 29,700 
Saudi Arabia 23,523 
India 21,874 
Turkey 21,758 
Brazil 19,550 
South Korea 18,306 
Spain                          14,443 
Canada 13,823 
Australia 13,389 
Israel 12,856 
Greece 11,335 
Netherlands 11,311 
United Arab 
Emirates 
10,940 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) available on 
http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2009.xls 
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Figure 2: Size of Military Expenditure in 2000 (in US$ million) 
 
 
 
As a matter of fact, comparison of the 2000 and 2009 military spending figures points out to 
two key trends: (a) the increase in military expenditure by the United States and the widening 
of the military spending gap between the U.S. and its highest military spending allies, and (b) 
the significant increase in the military spending of China (although China is still far from 
catching-up with America in terms of military expenditure).  
 
The next figure demonstrates the first trend graphically pointing out to the widening of the 
gap in military spending between the United States and its allies with the highest expenditure 
on military, perhaps highlighting their even recently increased reliance on America in the 
security realm.   
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Figure 3: Comparison of Military Spending of American Allies (2000 & 2009) 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) available on 
http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2009.xls 
 
This trend cannot be entirely explained by the decline in the military spending levels of 
America‟s allies, as some of those allies actually increased their military spending in 2009 
from its 2000 levels (fixing the prices and exchange rates at their 2008 levels), at least in 
absolute figures. The widening of the military spending gap between the United States and its 
allies is actually better explained by the steep rise in American military spending from 2000 
to 2009, which increased by seventy five percent (while accounting for inflation and 
exchange rate fluctuation). More importantly, as demonstrated in the next figures, not only 
did American military spending increase in absolute terms; it actually increased, as a share of 
the global military expenditure, from 36% to 43%. Those figures are based on the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) methodology used to determine military 
expenditure by country for each of the two reference years. While data is unavailable for 
some countries, suggesting that global military expenditure is actually higher than the result 
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observing the trend in America‟s relative share of global military expenditure, as by and 
large the same countries have missing data in both years.   
 
Figure 4: America’s Share of Global Military Expenditure (2000) 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) available on 
http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2009.xls
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Figure 5: America’s Share of Global Military Expenditure (2009) 
 
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) available on 
http://milexdata.sipri.org/files/?file=SIPRI+milex+data+1988-2009.xls
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The data on military expenditure does indeed point out to an American predominance in the 
security and military realm as a global hegemonic superpower, and more specifically to 
American dominance vis-à-vis U.S. allies (whether in Western Europe, the Asia-Pacific or 
the Middle East), and in fact suggests that this dominance is perhaps increasing rather than 
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U.S. does certainly have a lower share, the size of which cannot unfortunately be determined accurately. 
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decreasing with the passage of time. However, military expenditure does not alone confirm a 
dominant hegemonic military position for the United States, or more specifically a significant 
role for the U.S. in guaranteeing or effecting the security of its most important allies (which 
is the key element in determining whether America scores high on this first source of 
structural power).  
 
Therefore, it is also important to examine American military capabilities, especially with 
regards to the possession of advanced and strategic weaponry. In this regard, it is still quite 
prudent to analyze the data available on nuclear warheads and their delivery systems. With 
respect to nuclear warheads, the below table summarizes the estimated number of warheads 
possessed, as of January 2010, by each of the declared states in possession of nuclear arms, 
whether or not they are signatories of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
 
Table 3: Nuclear Warhead Estimates by Country  
 
Country Deployed warheads Other warheads Total 
United States 2,468  7,100  9,600  
Russia 4,630  7,300  12,000  
UK 160  65  225  
France 300  . .  300  
China . .  200-240 200-240  
India . .  60–80  60–80  
Pakistan . .  70–90  70–90  
Israel . .  80  80  
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) available on 
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2010/08 
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The foregoing data clearly points out to the unique positions of the United States and Russia, 
as the possessors of the largest number of nuclear warheads. However, more importantly, this 
data confirms that most of the U.S. allies, if not all of them, rely on American nuclear 
capabilities (without U.S. nuclear weapons, America‟s European allies, even the United 
Kingdom and France, would be exposed to a clear disparity in nuclear capability vis-à-vis 
Russia, and the same applies to its Asia-Pacific allies with respect to disparity with Russia 
and China, and potentially North Korea). As for delivery systems, it should be noted that the 
United States and Russia also have far more advanced capabilities, with each possessing 
multiple long-range ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile), SLBM (submarine launched 
ballistic missiles) and strategic bomber capabilities. The United Kingdom and France, being 
the American allies in possession of nuclear weapons, are far more limited in their delivery 
system capabilities compared to the United States or Russia.
103
 Therefore, America‟s allies in 
Europe, even the United Kingdom and France, still to date rely on American nuclear 
capabilities for their security, even if partially. 
 
Furthermore, in addition to America‟s providence of nuclear deterrent security to its allies, 
the United States also provides traditional security to many of its key allies, most notably, 
Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the oil-rich Gulf states, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar and 
Kuwait. This is a very crucial factor, as in the post-Cold War era, security is not limited to 
nuclear deterrence, with the emergence of other types of threats to security such as the 
horizontal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and global terrorism, and the 
diminishing of the threat of a nuclear confrontation between the East and the West. The 
presence of American troops in, or close to, the territories of those allies, which are either 
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 Search „nuclear forces‟ for each relevant country on http://first.sipri.org/ 
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industrialized economic powers or resource-rich economies, guarantees the U.S. a significant 
measure of structural power in relation to those states, especially those almost entirely reliant 
on American military presence both for national security and regime stability, which is very 
evident in the case of the oil-rich Gulf states. This not only helps America exert a lot of 
influence over those states in particular; it also cements the hegemonic status of the United 
States in international relations and the global economy in general. The below table lists the 
number of American troops on foreign soil or afloat overseas, clearly demonstrating a 
significant American presence in the Gulf region especially in and around Iraq, in the Asia-
Pacific region especially in Japan and South Korea, and in Western Europe especially in 
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom.    
   
Table 4: U.S. Foreign Troop Deployments (as of 30 September 2010)
104
  
 
Region/Country Number  Region/Country Number  Region/Country Number  Region/Country Number  
Europe   Sub-Saharan Africa   East Asia & Pacific   North Africa, Near East & South 
Asia 
  
Albania 8 Angola 7 Australia 130 Afghanistan (see Operation 
Enduring Freedom) 
0 
Austria 22 Botswana 9 Burma 12 Algeria 10 
Belgium 1,252 Burundi 6 Cambodia 11 Bahrain 1,349 
Bosnia & Herzegovina 8 Cameroon 9 China & Hong Kong 56 Bangladesh 8 
Bulgaria 15 Chad 10 Indonesia  & Timor 26 Diego Garcia 238 
Croatia 13 Congo (Brazzaville) 1 Japan 34,385 Egypt 275 
Cyprus 16 Congo (Kinshasa) 9 N. Korea 2 India 26 
Czech Republic 7 Cote D'Ivoire 8 S. Korea105 27,014 Iraq (see Operation New Dawn) 0 
Denmark 12 Djibouti 1,379 Laos 6 Israel 35 
Estonia 6 Eritrea 1 Malaysia 13 Jordan 30 
Finland 16 Ethiopia 9 Marshall Islands 16 Kuwait (see Operation New Dawn) 0 
France 64 Gabon 1 Mongolia 5 Lebanon 5 
Germany 53,951 Ghana 11 New Zealand 7 Morocco 12 
Greece 338 Guinea 8 Philippines 207 Nepal 9 
Greenland 133 Kenya 35 Singapore 132 Oman 30 
Hungary 54 Liberia 36 Thailand 110 Pakistan 133 
Ireland 8 Mali 6 Vietnam 16 Qatar 555 
Italy 9,646 Mauritania 8 Afloat 8,819 Saudi Arabia 239 
Latvia 7 Mozambique 6 Total  43,953 Sri Lanka 10 
Lithuania 7 Niger 6 Western Hemisphere   Syria 9 
Luxembourg 7 Nigeria 22 Antigua 2 Tunisia 12 
Macedonia 16 Rwanda 5 Argentina 23 United Arab Emirates 94 
Malta 6 Senegal 9 Bahamas, The 44 Yemen 15 
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 U.S. Department of Defense available on http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst1009.pdf 
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 As of 30 September 2007: available on http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/MILITARY/history/hst0709.pdf 
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Netherlands 442 Sierra Leone 2 Barbados 9 Afloat 4,717 
Norway 71 Somalia 19 Belize 2 Operation New Dawn 96,200 
Poland 34 South Africa 39 Bermuda 3 Operation Enduring Freedom 105,900 
Portugal 703 St. Helena  3 Bolivia 14 Total  209,911 
Romania 16 Sudan 3 Brazil 39   
Slovakia 10 Tanzania 12 Canada 127 
Slovenia 7 Togo 5 Chile 31 
Spain 1,240 Uganda 9 Colombia 62 
Sweden 11 Zambia 7 Costa Rica 8 
Switzerland 21 Zimbabwe 9 Cuba (Guantanamo) 913 
Turkey 1,530 Total  1,709 Dominican Republic 13 
United Kingdom 9,229   Ecuador 20 
Afloat 362   El Salvador 24 
Total  79,288   Guatemala 12 
Former Soviet Union     Guyana 2 
Armenia 9   Haiti 15 
Azerbaijan 8   Honduras 403 
Georgia 24   Jamaica 9 
Kazakhstan 15   Mexico 28 
Kyrgyzstan 11   Nicaragua 17 
Moldova 5   Panama 19 
Russia 47   Paraguay 11 
Tajikistan 6   Peru 42 
Turkmenistan 4   Suriname 1 
Ukraine 11   Trinidad and Tobago 8 
Uzbekistan 5   Uruguay 17 
Total  145   Venezuela 17 
    Afloat 8 
    Total  1,943 
 
Therefore, there are several indicators that the United States possesses structural power in the 
form of controlling the security of several key players in international relations and the global 
economy. On the one hand, American military expenditure clearly surpasses that of any other 
country, including all of its allies, and the gap in military spending between the United States 
and the most economically sound of its allies has actually widened recently. On the other 
hand, America‟s allies, whether in Europe or the Far East, rely on it for nuclear deterrence 
security vis-à-vis Russia, China and potentially North Korea. And, last but by no means least, 
American troops deployed on foreign soil and afloat overseas guarantee the security of 
several key allies of the United States, especially the oil-rich Gulf states, which also rely on 
American troops to guarantee regime stability. Therefore, for all of the forgoing reasons, 
America still enjoys considerable structural power in the security realm, at least vis-à-vis its 
allies in Western Europe, the Far East and the Gulf region.      
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B. AMERICAN CONTROL OF THE GLOBAL SYSTEM OF PRODUCTION  
 
Another measure of structural power according to Susan Strange is the ability to 
control the system of production. According to her, measuring the degree of American 
control over the global system of production is best determined not on the basis of America‟s 
purely numerical share of global output, but rather on the degree of prominence of American-
based corporations in the international economy.  
 
The relative decline in America‟s share in global production, which is taking place nowadays 
mainly due to the rapid development of emerging markets can be rather deceiving, if it is, in 
truth, driven by American-based corporations (among other Western-based corporations) 
increasingly moving their operations overseas, because even though such a trend would 
translate into a relatively lower share for the American economy in global production, it does 
not mean that the control or influence of the American economy over the structure of global 
production has decreased.  
 
As a matter of fact, in today‟s globalized world, many Western (and especially American) 
corporations are moving some of their activities to the developing world countries in search 
for cheap labor and other factors of production. However, although this translates into higher 
standards of living and higher GDPs for the developing countries, to take this as a sign of the 
economic empowerment of developing countries vis-à-vis the Western economic powers, 
especially the United States, would be rather naïve, as it would be ignoring the simple 
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realities of structural power, which basically boils down in this realm to who controls who 
produces what, where and for what price.    
 
In order to test this aspect of structural power empirically, an important starting point is to 
analyze the Fortune Global 500 list, which is an annual list of the world‟s largest 
corporations based on turnover and revenues, compiled by the renowned Fortune Magazine. 
The below table summarizes the breakdown of the Fortune Global 500 list for the year 2009 
on the main economic centers of the world.  
 
Table 5: Number of Fortune Global 500 Companies for 2009  
 
Economic Center 
 
Number of Fortune Global 500 Companies 
for 2009 
Australia 9 
Brazil 6 
Canada 14 
China/Hong Kong 37 
Eurozone 126 
Great Britain 27 
India 7 
Japan 68 
Mexico 4 
Other Centers 13 
Russia 8 
South Korea 14 
Sweden 6 
Switzerland 15 
Taiwan 6 
United States 140 
Source: Fortune Magazine available on http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2009/index.html 
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The foregoing data confirms that the United States, closely followed by the Eurozone, is the 
leading economic center in terms of the share of the largest companies in the world. 
However, as demonstrated in the below figure, the Fortune Global 500 data seems to suggest 
that there are two major economic centers in the world: the United States and the Eurozone. 
 
Figure 6: Number of Fortune Global 500 Companies for 2009 
 
The same observation is also valid, if rather than focusing on the number of companies per 
economic center, which can be misleading; the focus is on the total revenues of the Fortune 
Global 500 companies belonging to each of the main economic centers of the world. The 
next table and figure illustrate the consistency of the pattern of the United States leading with 
the greatest share followed closely by the Eurozone. 
  
Table 6: Total Fortune Global 500 Company Revenues (in US$ million) for 2009  
 
Economic Center 
Total Fortune Global 500 Company 
Revenues (in US$ million) for 2009 
Australia 300,231  
Brazil 323,673  
Canada 381,021  
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China/Hong Kong 1,660,834  
Eurozone 7,337,807  
Great Britain 1,585,173  
India 232,342  
Japan 2,979,580  
Mexico 196,263  
Other Centers 694,407  
Russia 402,506  
South Korea 603,406  
Sweden 173,918  
Switzerland 565,503  
Taiwan 195,075  
United States 7,543,730  
Source: Fortune Magazine available on http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2009/index.html 
 
Figure 7: Total Fortune Global 500 Company Revenues (in US$ million) for 2009 
 
Analysis of the Fortune Global 500 companies for the year 2005 reveals a substantially 
similar distribution of the world largest companies on the main economic centers, also with 
the United States having the lead followed closely by the Eurozone, whether in terms of the 
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number of companies or the breakdown by total revenues. The below figures illustrate the 
findings based on the 2005 data set. 
 
Figure 8: Number of Fortune Global 500 Companies for 2005 
  
 
Source: Fortune Magazine available on http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2005/index.html 
 
Figure 9: Total Fortune Global 500 Company Revenues (in US$ million) for 2005  
 
Source: Fortune Magazine available on http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2005/index.html 
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Comparison of the Fortune Global 500 data sets for the years 2005 and 2009 reveals several 
trends: (a) a decline in the shares of the United States, Great Britain and Japan, (b) a slight 
increase in the share of the Eurozone, and (c) a significant increase in the share of emerging 
market economies, especially China. The below figures illustrate the comparison of the two 
data sets. 
 
Figure 10: Comparison of Fortune Global 500 Data (2005 & 2009) by Number of 
Companies 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Comparison of Fortune Global 500 Data (2005 & 2009) by Percentage of 
Total Revenues  
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Therefore, analysis of the Fortune Global 500 data suggests that (a) the United States does 
not have an absolute or unrivaled control over the global system of production, as the 
strength of its corporations (although slightly stronger) is almost matched by those based in 
the Eurozone, and (b) that the Eurozone and China (and other emerging markets) are steadily 
catching-up with the United States. 
 
However, analysis of the FT Global 500, which is an annual ranking of the world‟s largest 
companies released by Financial Times, but based on market capitalization, reveals a 
completely different pattern. The strength of American-based corporations, in terms of 
market capitalization, is unrivaled and points out to a clear dominance by the United States. 
The next figures demonstrate the unparalleled position of the United States both in terms of 
number of companies and total market value in light of the FT Global 500 list for the year 
2010.  
 
Figure 12: Number of FT Global 500 Companies for 2010  
 
Source: Financial Times available on http://www.ft.com/reports/ft500-2010 
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Figure 13: Total Market Value of FT Global 500 Companies for 2010 (in US$ million) 
  
 
Source: Financial Times available on http://www.ft.com/reports/ft500-2010 
 
The degree of dominance of American-based corporations is best illustrated by the below 
figure, which demonstrates the relative sizes of the market values of the FT Global 500 
companies belonging to each of the main economic centers of the world. 
  
Figure 14: Distribution of Market Values of FT Global 500 Companies (v1) 
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Figure 15: Distribution of Market Values of FT Global 500 Companies (v2) 
 
As demonstrated in the above figure, it is suffice to say that the relative market value of the 
American-based corporations listed on the FT Global 500 list for 2010 is roughly equivalent 
to the relative market value of all of the corporations belonging to the other main financial 
centers combined (the Eurozone, Great Britain, Japan and China/Hong Kong), and 
significantly more than the relative market value of the corporations of the rest of the world 
combined (which includes the rest of Europe and the rest of the emerging markets, in 
addition to Canada and Australia). Analysis of the FT Global 500 data set, therefore, clearly 
demonstrates the dominance of American corporations in the international economy and 
proves beyond doubt an unrivaled degree of dominance for the United States in shaping the 
structure of international production.  
 
The question is how this may be reconciled with the analysis of the Fortune Global 500 data 
set, which although puts the United States on top, reveals rivalry from the Eurozone and 
relative decline over time. The answer is simply that, because the Fortune Global 500 list is 
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companies, and of computer technology and software companies, which may have much 
higher value than their annual turnover suggests.  
 
As a matter of fact, it is perhaps in those two sectors where American-based corporations are 
truly dominant. More importantly, on the one hand, the banks and financial services sector 
plays an important role in shaping the structure of international credit and not just the 
structure of global production. On the other hand, the computer technology and software 
sector is also shaping the future of the world from the social and cultural perspectives. For 
example, companies such as Facebook, Apple, Twitter, Google and Microsoft, which are all 
based in the United States, are producing products, gadgets, applications and programs that 
are truly changing the means of social and cultural interaction between millions of people 
worldwide. Their significance cannot, therefore, be captured by their turnovers or even their 
market capitalizations, and their influence and importance cannot be compared to the 
influence and importance of oil services or automobile manufacturing companies of similar 
turnover or market capitalization. A case in point, in this regard, is how Facebook and 
Twitter facilitated interaction among youths in Tunisia and Egypt, resulting in massive 
demonstrations that have very recently resulted in regime change.   
 
As such, the FT Global 500 data set is far more accurate in describing the world‟s most 
valuable and influential corporations, and hence provides a more accurate measure of the 
influence of American-based corporations on the structure of the global economy. 
Accordingly, it is apparent that the United States still retains a significant degree of control 
on the structure of global production, and that it clearly enjoys significant structural power in 
this realm.   
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C. AMERICAN CONTROL OF GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS  
 
Susan Strange also argues that the dominance of the U.S. Dollar has enabled America 
to run staggering deficits and remain largely unaffected, which demonstrates that those huge 
deficits are a sign of the structural power of America and not of the relative weakness of the 
American economy. The below table summarizes the breakdown of official foreign exchange 
reserves in the world among the various international currencies during the period between 
1995 and 2009. 
 
Table 7: Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (in US$ million) 
 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
U.S. Dollars 610337 760071 828887 888724 979783 1079916 1122431 1204673 
Pounds Sterling 21874 32883 32856 34142 39827 41798 42401 50537 
Deutsche Marks 163088 179916 184349 176951 0 0 0 0 
French Francs 24361 22638 18314 20814 0 0 0 0 
Japanese Yens 70071 82307 73487 80029 87939 92078 79190 78145 
Swiss Francs 3464 3705 4435 4237 3172 4087 4372 7314 
Netherlands Guilders 3306 2935 4461 3489 0 0 0 0 
ECUs 88288 86837 77322 16637 0 0 0 0 
Euros 0 0 0 0 246950 277693 301026 427327 
Other Currencies 49387 53172 47871 57383 22034 22672 20069 27919 
Allocated Reserves 1034175 1224464 1271982 1282406 1379705 1518244 1569488 1795915 
Unallocated Reserves  355626 341805 344266 361397 402242 418039 480092 612063 
Total Holdings 1389801 1566268 1616248 1643803 1781947 1936282 2049580 2407978 
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
U.S. Dollars 1465752 1751012 1902535 2171075 2641645 2699122 2837844 
Pounds Sterling 61655 89457 102243 145205 192663 168773 194183 
Deutsche Marks 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
French Francs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Japanese Yens 87608 101787 101769 102051 120480 131902 137680 
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Swiss Francs 5016 4419 4143 5685 6395 5799 5318 
Netherlands Guilders 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
ECUs 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Euros 559246 658531 683809 831947 1082276 1112223 1249954 
Other Currencies 43833 49865 49041 59520 75731 92806 141774 
Allocated Reserves 2223110 2655070 2843541 3315483 4119190 4210624 4566753 
Unallocated Reserves 801961 1093288 1459417 1919612 2563271 3110934 3520052 
Total Holdings 3025071 3748358 4302958 5235095 6682461 7321558 8086805 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF) available on http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/cofer/eng/index.htm 
 
The below figure demonstrates the allocation of the official foreign reserves among the 
different currencies expressed as percentages, which gives a clearer picture on the relative 
weights of the reserves denominated in those currencies during the same period from 1995 to 
2009.  
 
Figure 16: Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves (1995-2009) 
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As demonstrated in the preceding figure, the U.S. Dollar has remained the most dominant 
currency in which official foreign exchange reserves are held across the world throughout the 
period examined spanning almost a decade and a half. Reserves denominated in Dollars have 
constituted, on average, close to two-thirds of the overall foreign currency reserves during 
said period. Although, as highlighted by the preceding data, the relative weight of the official 
foreign reserves denominated in Euros has grown gradually during the past few years, the 
effect this has had on the dominance of the U.S. Dollar has remained quite minimal, with the 
Dollar still firmly ahead of the Euro, and with Dollar reserves still constituting more than 
double the Euro reserves. The below figure illustrates the composition by currency of the 
official foreign exchange reserves held by various countries in 2009, demonstrating the 
continued dominance of the U.S. Dollar until very recently. 
 
Figure 17: Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves in 2009 
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The need for governments and central banks all over the world to hold significant U.S. Dollar 
reserves actually reflects the dominance of the Dollar as the predominant currency of 
international trade (i.e. governments and central banks all over the world need to hold Dollar 
reserves in order to purchase Dollar denominated commodities, most importantly oil).  A 
telling measure of the prominent role of the U.S. Dollar in international trade is its large 
relative share of the foreign exchange turnover, as demonstrated in the below table. 
 
Table 8: Currency Distribution of Foreign Exchange Turnover at April 2007 Exchange 
Rates (percentage share of average daily turnover)
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Year 2001 2004 2007 
U.S. Dollar 76.16% 85.25% 86.35% 
Euro 48.06% 40.00% 36.98% 
Japanese Yen 19.89% 17.56% 16.54% 
Pound Sterling  15.47% 17.88% 14.95% 
Swiss Franc  7.22% 6.19% 6.78% 
Australian Dollar  5.90% 6.33% 6.66% 
Canadian Dollar 5.16% 4.73% 4.21% 
Swedish Krona 2.59% 2.43% 2.78% 
Hong Kong Dollar 1.88% 1.78% 2.78% 
Other Currencies 17.67% 17.85% 21.97% 
 
As illustrated graphically in the next figure, the dominance of the U.S. Dollar in foreign trade 
transactions remained very evident as late as 2007. 
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Figure 18: Currency Distribution of Foreign Exchange Turnover (as at 2007) 
 
The need to accumulate reserves in Dollars not only arises due to the requirements of 
purchasing essential commodities denominated in U.S. Dollars; it is also magnified due to 
the requirements of servicing Dollar denominated debts. A case in point in this regard is the 
huge portion of the U.S. Dollar cross-border liabilities of banks denominated in foreign 
currencies, as demonstrated in the below table. 
 
Table 9: Foreign Currency Denominated Cross-border Liabilities of Banks (total 
amount outstanding as of reference period in US$ billion)  
 
Period Dec-07 Dec-08 Dec-09 
U.S. Dollar 10,021.50 9,261.00 9,073.00 
Euro 3,475.00 3,262.20 3,158.20 
Yen 824.20 825.80 578.50 
Pound Sterling 1,326.10 1,006.50 857.00 
Swiss Franc 395.20 405.60 371.00 
Other 1,485.40 1,281.60 1,363.70 
Total Allocated 17,527.40 16,042.70 15,401.40 
Source: Bank of International Settlements available on http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa1006.pdf 
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The below figure illustrates the clear significance of U.S. Dollar denominated debt in light of 
the preceding data. 
 
Figure 19: Foreign Currency Denominated Cross-border Liabilities of Banks 
(percentage as of reference period) 
 
As illustrated in the figure below, as late as December 2009, U.S. Dollar denominated bank 
debt was almost of 60% of the total foreign currency denominated cross-border bank debt. 
 
Figure 20: Foreign Currency Denominated Cross-border Liabilities of Banks 
(breakdown by currency as of December 2009) 
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Therefore, based on the preceding data, it is clear that Strange‟s arguments with respect to 
the dominance of the U.S. Dollar remain valid today. The U.S. Dollar is still, by and large, 
the world‟s leading reserve currency. It has occupied this position because it clearly remains 
the world‟s leading vehicle and invoicing currency, with many international trade 
transactions not necessarily involving an American counterparty being consummated in U.S. 
Dollars. This is particularly significant, as the trade of many of the most important 
commodities (especially oil) is still conducted in U.S. Dollars, although there are recent signs 
that major oil producers such as Russia and Iran are seeking to reverse this trend. Of equal 
importance is the fact that the U.S. Dollar is the most prominent currency in the international 
debt markets. To put it simply, governments and central banks are making sure national 
savings are held in Dollars to be able to service national debt denominated in Dollars and 
also to purchase important and strategic commodities that are sold on the international 
markets mainly in Dollars. 
 
A few decades ago, several scholars argued that the abolition of the gold standard, the 
devaluation of the Dollar, and the rise in oil prices, which was followed by global inflation, 
all worked in America‟s favor, or maybe even were deliberately orchestrated by the United 
States. It is rather doubtful that the United States was fully aware of the positive implications 
the abolition of the gold standard, and the events that followed that economic earthquake, 
will ultimately have on the American status in the global economy. However, it is very 
evident that the main outcome of those events, being the concentration of America‟s 
structural power as the hegemon with the extraordinary privilege of having its currency as the 
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global reserve currency, has placed and continues to place America in a uniquely 
advantageous position. 
 
This position can be summarized as follows: (a) ever since the abolition of the gold standard 
in 1971, the U.S. Dollar has been the global reserve currency that only the United States can 
generate by fiat (i.e. by law or decree and without pegging to gold or any other currency or 
valuable commodity); (b) as a result of this unique privilege, the United States is allowed to 
simply produce Dollars, while the rest of the world, including all the other leading economic 
powers, have to produce goods and services or dispose of their natural resources that can all 
be sold for Dollars, which are then used to buy goods, services and natural resources also 
denominated in Dollars from international markets, or to service Dollar denominated debts; 
(c) consequently, major economic players, especially emerging market economies that face 
speculative threats to their national currencies, hold most of their savings, and especially 
their foreign currency reserves in Dollars; and (d) this continuous appetite for Dollars creates 
a sizeable international demand for Dollars, which in turn reinforces the strength of the 
Dollar, and hence ensures it remains the preferred global reserve currency. One of the 
necessary preconditions for this American hegemonic privilege is that major commodities 
(especially oil) continue to be bought and sold in Dollars, and that in particular explains the 
continuous American strategic interest in the stability, and American dominance, of the 
Middle East region, which accounts for the majority of global oil and gas reserves.  
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A buy-product of this position is the staggering deficits run by the American economy, with 
the American national debt standing in 2009 at around 11 trillion U.S. Dollars.
107
 However, 
this apparent debt problem is not a sign of weakness but rather a demonstration of America‟s 
structural power emanating from the position of the U.S. Dollar as the global reserve 
currency. Because the other economic powers of the world have a continued demand for 
more and more Dollars, they are continuously lending the United States, especially by 
purchasing U.S. treasury bills. In other words, America is running huge deficits because the 
rest of the world is financing the United States due to the need to hold U.S. Dollar reserves. 
Simply put, this element of structural power is giving America a free ride in the world 
economy, as it can go on printing Dollars and issuing t-bills, as long as other nations are 
willing to buy those t-bills, thereby basically bankrolling the American economy. This is in 
fact the clearest and most evident sign of American economic hegemony.  
 
The next table lists the major foreign holders of U.S. t-bills as of April 2010. This list 
confirms that the holders of U.S. treasury bills include almost all of the major economic 
players in the world, including advanced industrial centers (such as Japan, Germany and 
France), offshore financial centers (the so-called Caribbean Banking Centers), oil producers 
(the so-called Oil Producers as well as Russia) and the key emerging markets (such as Brazil, 
South Korea, Turkey, Mexico and Egypt), and most notably and at the top of the list, China. 
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Table 10: Major Holders of U.S. Treasury Bills  
 
County/Economic Player Holdings in billions of USD 
China 900.2 
Japan 795.5 
U.K. 321.2 
Oil Exporters 239.3 
Brazil 164.3 
Caribbean Banking Centers 153.2 
Hong Kong 151.8 
Taiwan 126.9 
Russia 113.1 
Canada 81.7 
Switzerland 80 
Luxembourg 77.6 
Germany 54.3 
Thailand 46.9 
Ireland 45.7 
Singapore 42.4 
France 38.8 
S. Korea 38.7 
Mexico 33.1 
India 31 
Turkey 27.9 
Poland 24.6 
Egypt 21.1 
Italy 20.3 
Others 327.80 
Total 3,957.40 
Source: Department of the Treasury/Federal Reserve Board available on http://www.treas.gov/tic/mfh.txt 
  
The huge U.S. t-bill holdings of China are of particular significance. According to Farid 
Zakaria, the structure of the world economy is characterized by the dyadic interplay between 
China and the United States. On the one hand, the United States, due its unique hegemonic 
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privilege, is able to basically print Dollars and issue t-bills that are in demand by the other 
key economic players of the world, which has led to a wild unrivaled debt accumulation and 
consumption tendency in the American economy. On the other hand, China, being the 
world‟s largest emerging market economy, is committed to saving, and to accumulating its 
savings by purchasing U.S. t-bills.
108
 In other words, China bankrolled and continues to 
bankroll the American economy. As a matter of fact, America‟s consumerism fueled by the 
debt accumulated from China and other key players in the world economy, has helped 
catalyze Chinese growth by enabling China to furnish the American economy with more and 
more consumer goods. Therefore, the more China produces, the more America consumes, 
and the more China saves, and hence the more America accumulates debt, which America 
uses to buy more Chinese products in a continuous cycle of production-consumption / 
saving-debt accumulation. 
 
This awkward dynamic between the world‟s most developed economy and its fastest growing 
economy ensured the 1990s and the early years of the twenty-first century were an era of 
growth and stability not only in the United States and China, but for most of the other major 
economies of the world, perhaps except for Japan (for reasons unique to it). However, this 
set-up proved to be a blessing in disguise and actually a recipe for disaster. Zakaria argues 
brilliantly that it is particularly the access of the American banks and public to „cheap 
money‟ that led to speculative trends and uncontrolled poisonous financial innovation within 
the American economy, which ultimately led to the sub-prime mortgage crisis followed by 
the recent financial meltdown in the United States, and finally resulted in a major economic 
crisis not only in the American economy but all over the world, and one that could have led 
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to a worldwide recession had it not been for unparalleled governmental intervention and 
international coordination.
109
  
 
However, the financial meltdown, although the lessons learnt from its causes and 
consequences will not be soon forgotten, and although it could prove to be the beginning of 
huge changes in the structure of the global economy, did not result in the crippling of the 
American economy, as some anticipated. Actually, the American economy returned to real 
growth in late 2009 (i.e. about one year after the meltdown in the financial markets), much 
earlier than most experts anticipated. More significantly, as events unfolded, it has become 
apparent that the American economy, at least in terms of output, fared much better than most 
of the advanced economies. This is demonstrated in the below table, which summarizes the 
annual change in gross domestic product (GDP) across the developed economies, based on 
actual data and projections during the years 2008, 2009 and 2010. As evident from this data, 
the performance of the American economy, measured in terms of output, has been better than 
that of most of the advanced economies, especially in 2009 and even more so in 2010. 
 
Table 11: Annual Change in GDP for Advanced Economies (% change; including 
projections) 
   
 2008 2009 2010 
Australia 2.38 1.33 2.96 
Austria 2.05 -3.61 1.33 
Belgium 0.83 -3.01 1.15 
Canada 0.41 -2.64 3.14 
Cyprus 3.62 -1.74 -0.69 
Czech Republic 2.46 -4.29 1.68 
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Denmark -0.87 -5.07 1.20 
Finland 1.21 -7.76 1.25 
France 0.32 -2.19 1.52 
Germany 1.25 -4.97 1.21 
Greece 2.02 -1.96 -2.00 
Hong Kong 2.15 -2.66 5.02 
Iceland 0.96 -6.49 -3.04 
Ireland -3.04 -7.10 -1.55 
Israel 4.00 0.71 3.20 
Italy -1.32 -5.04 0.84 
Japan -1.19 -5.20 1.90 
Korea 2.30 0.20 4.51 
Luxembourg 0.03 -4.22 2.08 
Malta 2.14 -1.93 0.47 
Netherlands 2.00 -3.98 1.30 
New Zealand -0.15 -1.59 2.88 
Norway 1.82 -1.52 1.08 
Portugal 0.04 -2.68 0.29 
Singapore 1.39 -2.02 5.68 
Slovak Republic 6.17 -4.66 4.10 
Slovenia 3.49 -7.33 1.12 
Spain 0.86 -3.64 -0.41 
Sweden -0.16 -4.40 1.23 
Switzerland 1.78 -1.45 1.53 
Taiwan  0.73 -1.87 6.50 
United Kingdom 0.55 -4.92 1.34 
United States 0.44 -2.44 3.10 
Average 1.23 -3.34 1.69 
Source: International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Economic Outlook Database available on: 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2010/01/weodata/index.aspx 
   
As illustrated in the next figure, the American economy‟s performance is above average and 
certainly better than most of the rest of the G7 economies, which should be taken as a sign of 
the relative strength of the American economy, especially in light of the fact that the financial 
crisis originated in the United States. Actually, recent events have rather confirmed that the 
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American economy has absorbed the financial crisis far better than Europe has, with the 
Dollar appreciating in value against the Euro and the Pound Sterling, all the more stressing 
the importance of the Dollar as the global reserve currency. 
 
Figure 21: Annual Change in GDP for Advanced Economies (% change; including 
projections) 
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D. AMERICAN INFLUENCE OVER KNOWLEDGE  
 
According to Susan Strange, the ability to exert the most influence over knowledge is 
another factor of structural power. Although it is rather difficult to examine this factor 
empirically, as knowledge, or influence over knowledge, is difficult to express in raw figures, 
two of the most appropriate indicators of this attribute of structural power are the American 
share of top ranking universities and the American share of Nobel Prize laureates in natural 
sciences. 
 
With regards to top ranking universities, one of the most widely accepted rankings of top 
universities worldwide is the Academic Ranking of World Universities (ARWU), which is 
published by the Center for World-Class Universities and the Institute of Higher Education 
of Shanghai Jiao Tong University, China. The ARWU is based on various objective 
indicators used to rank universities worldwide, including, the number of alumni winning 
prestigious international awards, the number of publications in internationally renowned 
scientific journals, and the number of highly cited researchers and articles.
110
 The ARWU 
ranking for the year 2010, as illustrated in the next table and figure, reflects the clear 
dominance of American universities. 
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Table 12: ARWU 2010 Ranking Analysis  
 
 
% of Top 20 
Universities 
% of Top 100 
Universities 
% of Top 500 
Universities 
Australia 0.00% 3.00% 3.40% 
Canada 0.00% 4.00% 4.60% 
China 0.00% 0% 6.80% 
Europe 10.00% 32.00% 40.40% 
Japan 5.00% 5.00% 5.00% 
Other 0.00% 1.00% 8.60% 
Russia 0.00% 1.00% 0.40% 
United States 85.00% 54.00% 30.80% 
Source: Center for World-Class Universities and the Institute of Higher Education of Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University, China available on http://www.arwu.org/ARWU2010.jsp 
 
Figure 22: Analysis of ARWU 2010 Ranking 
 
As demonstrated above, American universities clearly dominated the ARWU 2010 ranking. 
Out of the top 20 universities, 17 were American, representing 85% of the total. Even upon 
expanding the list to the top 100 and top 500 universities, American universities are still 
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dominant representing 54% and 30.8%, respectively. The European universities appear to be 
comparable to the position of American universities only upon the expansion of the list to the 
top 500 universities, which basically means that the top ranking universities worldwide are 
predominately American, and that the best American universities are still unrivaled to date. 
This proves that the United States still enjoys a huge influence over knowledge, as measured 
by the location of the world‟s most influential scientists, researchers and research institutes in 
America.  
 
Analysis of the ARWU 2005 ranking reveals the same pattern, as illustrated in the next table 
and figure. 
 
Table 13: ARWU 2005 Ranking Analysis  
 
 
% of Top 20 
Universities 
% of Top 100 
Universities 
% of Top 500 
Universities 
Australia 0.00% 2.00% 2.80% 
Canada 0.00% 4.00% 4.60% 
China 0.00% 0.00% 3.60% 
Europe 10.00% 34.00% 40.60% 
Japan 5.00% 5.00% 6.80% 
Other 0.00% 1.00% 7.60% 
Russia 0.00% 1.00% 0.40% 
United States 85.00% 53.00% 33.60% 
Source: Center for World-Class Universities and the Institute of Higher Education of Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University, China available on http://www.arwu.org/ARWU2005.jsp 
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Figure 23: Analysis of ARWU 2005 Ranking  
 
Analysis of the ARWU 2005 ranking confirms that the position of dominance of American 
universities is persisting with little if any change, or any serious challenge from universities 
from any other region in the world. To put it differently, there is no indication of a trend 
suggesting the decrease of this dominance over time, at least over the recent period 2005-
2010. The next figure illustrates that the position of American universities in the ARWU 
ranking has almost remained the same between 2005 and 2010. 
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Figure 24: Comparison of the 2005 & 2010 Positions of American Universities in the 
ARWU Ranking  
 
  Therefore, it is quite evident that American universities have dominated and continue to 
dominate one of the most widely accepted rankings of universities worldwide, suggesting 
that, at least in terms of the strength and success of its universities, America continues to 
exert a substantial influence on knowledge.  
 
A more focused approach, based entirely on the Nobel Prizes awarded in natural sciences 
also reveals a similar pattern of American dominance. As illustrated in the next table and 
figure, between the years 1990 and 2010 (i.e. the past two decades), 64% of the universities / 
research institutes affiliated with Nobel Prize winners in natural sciences (physics, chemistry 
and medicine / physiology) were American, with European universities / research institutes 
coming second at only 24%. The fact that American institutions represent more than half of 
the institutions affiliated with Nobel Prize winners in natural sciences during the past two 
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decades is a very clear indication of how powerful the American influence over knowledge 
still remains today. 
 
Table 14: Distribution of Affiliations with Nobel Prize Winners in Natural Sciences 
(1990-2010)
111
 
 
Europe 37 
Japan 8 
Other 10 
United States 97 
Total 152 
 
Figure 25: Distribution of Affiliations with Nobel Prize Winners in Natural Sciences 
(1990-2010) 
 
Analysis of the ARWU rankings and the affiliations with Nobel Prize winners in natural 
sciences therefore clearly demonstrates that American universities and research institutions 
are still the most dominant in the world, providing the most renowned scientists and 
researchers, and the most published and cited articles, especially in natural sciences and 
mathematics. This demonstrates that the United States continues to exert a considerable 
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influence over knowledge, and that it enjoys a unique position in terms of this aspect of 
structural power compared to any other player, including Europe and Japan, which 
undoubtedly adds to the ability of the United States to sustain its hegemony in the world 
economy and the international system.  
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IV. AMERICAN SOFT POWER & LEGITIMACY: A CASE STUDY  
 
In 1991, the United States led a wide coalition of Europeans, Arabs and Americans 
fighting together under U.S. command to successfully liberate Kuwait and defeat Saddam 
Hussein, with the blessings of the United Nations, and even with the tacit support of the 
Soviet Union, then still in existence.
112
 This was one of the highest points in the American 
legitimate hegemony in the international system since the Second World War if not the 
highest. More than two decades later, in 2003, the United States went to war for a second 
time with Hussein‟s Iraq, almost unilaterally and without the participation of any major Arab 
country, without participation of any of its key allies in Western Europe with the exception of 
Great Britain, and without the blessings of the United Nations.
113
  
 
The contrast between the multilateral UN-backed operation to liberate an occupied nation in 
clear implementation of the doctrine of collective international security, and the almost 
unilateral invasion of a sovereign state outside the boundaries of international law is very 
clear. In fact, aside from the obvious costs in terms of human loss and heavy economic 
burden of this war, and also notwithstanding that this war has resulted in greater instability in 
the Middle East and increased Iranian influence in the region (contrary to American policy 
objectives), the most serious loss resulting from this war, was the tarnishing of America‟s 
image as the leader of the so-called „free-world‟ and the diminishment of its legitimacy on 
the one hand, and the obvious rifts this war has caused between America and several of its 
closest allies in Western Europe, most notably France and Germany, on the other hand. 
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The 1991 liberation of Kuwait, a war were America clearly possessed the moral high ground 
and acted with the approval of the United Nations as a leader of a multilateral and legitimate 
effort to confront an obvious breach of international law and threat to international security, 
was evidence of the stabilizing and benevolent role the United States could play through its 
hegemony in the international system. As a matter of fact, the US-led coalition, having 
liberated Kuwait, and soundly defeated Hussein‟s army, could have marched on to Baghdad 
and toppled him from power, but it did not do so, as the United States elected to remain 
within the boundaries of legitimacy and the mandate granted by the United Nations Security 
Council.
114
 Hence, the liberation of Kuwait was a triumph for American foreign policy that 
allowed the United States, as the Cold War drew to an end, to capitalize on its power base 
and establish its hegemonic role on the solid foundations of legitimacy.  
 
Conversely, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, which was launched without any meaningful Arab 
support, without the blessings of the United Nations and in spite of serious objections by 
most of America‟s key allies in Europe, and in breach of international law, was evidence of 
the potentially destabilizing role the U.S. could play through its hegemony in the 
international system, if it decides to act unilaterally without due regard to the legitimacy of 
its actions or the wishes of its allies. Therefore, refusal to take part in or support the invasion, 
and opposition to the U.S. efforts to ensure a Security Council cover for the invasion, became 
a clear policy objective for several American allies in Western Europe, notably France and 
Germany.
115
 This ultimately led to the erosion of any meaningful legitimacy for the US-led 
                                                 
114
 Kashmeri 2007, 25. 
115
 Ibid. 
80 
 
invasion, in spite of the participations of other nations, most importantly, the United 
Kingdom.  
 
Jurgen Habermas summarizes the destructive effects this unilateral war, and the so-called 
“War on Terror”, has had on the perception of America‟s role in the international system, and 
especially on American-European relations by arguing that: “The West was not divided by 
the danger of international terrorism but by policies of the current US government that ignore 
international law, marginalize the United Nations and accept the inevitability of the break 
with Europe”.116 According to him, the Iraq war has tarnished the reputation of the United 
States, marked America‟s abandonment of its role as the protector of international rights, and 
in fact signaled America‟s willingness to breach international law.117 He contends that this 
invasion did not meet the legal requirements for the use of military force, as it was neither a 
case of self-defense nor was it authorized by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter.
118
  
 
It is rather tempting to analyze the decision to invade Iraq unilaterally and its consequences 
with respect to American-European relations in particular, and the international perception of 
America‟s role in the international system in general, as an isolated event. However, it is 
would be more meaningful to place this decision or policy objective within a wider trend in 
American foreign policy, in order to better appreciate the context of this decision, and hence 
the huge repercussions it has had and continues to have on American foreign policy, 
American-European relations, and the international perception of America‟s hegemonic role. 
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According to Harald Muller, the invasion of Iraq was an “expression of a particular world 
view” in the American foreign policy and security circles.119 He believes that the roots of this 
worldview date back to the 1970s, and can be found in the work of the “Committee on the 
Present Danger”, a conservative think tank that contributed to the formulation of American 
foreign policy under the Regan Administration, and which began to effect American foreign 
policy, and would have continued to move it towards a more unilateral and confrontational 
approach, had it not been for the sudden demise of the Soviet Union, which required the 
United States to adopt a more balanced foreign policy.
120
 This worldview, according to him, 
somewhat shaped the “Defense Planning Guidance” of 1992 formulated by the Pentagon, 
during the reign of the Bush Sr. Administration, then led by Dick Cheney as the Secretary of 
Defense, and became very evident in the “National Security Strategy” developed in 2002 
with the advent to power of the Bush Jr. Administration.
121
     
 
The underlying foundation of this essentially neo-conservative worldview is placing very 
high importance on securing “freedom of action” for the United States, which particularly 
manifests itself in refusing to consider further arms control and refusing to be bound by 
international law.
122
 The basis for this approach is that the U.S. should use its sheer power to 
force a particular order on the international system by actively seeking to impose democracy 
and free trade without regard for unnecessary legal or institutional constraints and without 
hesitation.
123
 Therefore, according to this approach, international law, international 
organizations and international regimes could possibly assist in America‟s efforts to impose 
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such order on the international system, but could in the meantime hamper American efforts, 
in which case America should act on its own and without constraining its decision-making 
ability.
124
  
 
In the meantime, the United States should realize that so-called “rogue states” are a serious 
threat to its hegemony and should be prevented through preventative intervention by the U.S. 
from acquiring superior military capabilities (and in particular weapons of mass destruction), 
and in doing so, the United States does not need to form or lead multilateral coalitions based 
on “formal alliances” or “collective security institutions” such as the U.N. or NATO; instead, 
participation in such preventative interventions should be on the basis of ad-hoc “coalitions 
of the willing” involving “sympathetic governments”. This approach emanates from a belief 
that the UN is a constraint on the American freedom of action, which is unnecessary, given 
American hegemony and supremacy.
125
  It seems that this approach to foreign policy 
basically means that the United States “no longer has to play by the rules and has the right 
and the ability to impose a kind of Pax Americana on the rest of the world”.126 
 
This new doctrine was detailed in the so-called “Project for the New American Century”, and 
it became very evident that the Bush Administration is driven by the foundations of this 
doctrine, especially the notions of American “exceptionalism” and “unilateralism”, and the 
overall objective of the U.S. reaching the “full spectrum of dominance”.127 This monumental 
change in American foreign policy was also declared and detailed in the 2002 “National 
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Security Strategy”, which clearly called for the United States to intervene preemptively 
against any country the U.S. believes is developing weapons of mass destruction, and even 
where there is merely a potential for the development of such weapons sometime in the 
future, which actually means that the United States endorsed a doctrine of “preventative war” 
and not just one of “preemptive war”.128  
 
The distinction between those two doctrines is that preemption is founded on the premise of 
the existence of an imminent threat, whereas prevention pertains to the mere notion of a 
potential threat, and this is an important distinction because preemptive war has the backing 
of a few international law scholars, while preventative war is completely inconsistent with 
international law, which allows the use of force only in self-defense or in application of the 
collective security arrangements set forth in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. It might be 
acceptable, nevertheless, to stretch the definition of self-defense to address imminent threats 
of the use of force, hence allowing for the notion of preemptive war. However, stretching 
self-defense to addressing potential threats would open Pandora‟s Box, and allow for the 
abuse of international law based on subjective assessments of threats, which was actually 
very evident in the attempts of the United States to justify the war on Iraq on rather lame 
foundations. In any case, the new American national security doctrine codified and published 
in 2002 defended the legitimacy of preemptive action
129
, but in a manner suggesting that no 
clear distinction is made between imminent and potential threats, and therefore that no clear 
distinction is made between preemptive and preventative war.        
 
                                                 
128
 Zunes 2006, 28. 
129
 Huldt 2005, 45. 
84 
 
The Iraq invasion must, therefore, be analyzed within the context of this worldview or 
approach to the formulation of American foreign policy and security strategy. It is not an 
isolated event, and should not be perceived as such. In fact, the first few months of the Bush 
Administration clearly point out to early signs of the huge effect this approach had on 
American foreign policy during his eight-year reign. For example, there were clear signs, 
very early on in the life of the Bush Administration, of a deliberate policy to gain freedom of 
action for the U.S. by avoiding additional international commitments. The Bush 
Administration, for example, refused to sign the Kyoto Protocol on climate change and the 
statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), and even proceeded to terminate the Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
130
  
 
The September 11
th
 attacks of 2001 won the United States sympathy all over the world, and 
in particular in Europe. However, the neo-conservatives within the Bush Administration 
utilized those attacks to serve their own agenda, and silence opposition from traditional 
conservatives within the Administration, such as Colin Powell.
131
 In the meantime, European 
skepticism concerning the new trends in American foreign policy did not begin with the Iraq 
invasion in 2003. Although there was obvious sympathy across the Atlantic, the early record 
per-9/11 of the Bush Administration did not go unnoticed, and there were even signs of 
European discomfort with the “missionary” style of President Bush and his staff and the way 
they sought to exploit those tragic terrorist attacks.
132
 In spite of the fact that almost all of the 
European leaders, supported by European general public opinion, were very supportive of the 
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U.S. and clearly condemned the terrorist attacks, there were some fears that the Bush 
Administration would use those attacks to launch a disproportionate response.
133
  
 
Nevertheless, the American retaliation against the Taliban regime was mostly acceptable. As 
soon as the United States established connections between Al-Qaida and the 9/11 attacks, 
almost all Europeans accepted the need to attack Al-Qaida in Afghanistan, and it is of crucial 
importance to note here that the war on the Taliban regime was approved by the United 
Nations.
134
 However, when President Bush implied that the military operations could extend 
to Iraq, Iran and North Korea, the so-called “Axis of Evil”, Europe started to become 
increasingly alarmed.
135
 It became clearer with time that the United States is keen, following 
the war on the Taliban regime, to force the Iraq issue on the international agenda, which was 
met with discomfort and unease by several of its European allies, most notably France.
136
 
Europeans supported targeted attacks on terrorists in Afghanistan, but as the rhetoric and 
policies changed to a global war on terror and a war between „good‟ and „evil‟, rifts between 
Europeans and Americans started to emerge.
137
 Even before talk of the invasion of Iraq 
began, concerns started to emerge that the United States was waging the so-called “War on 
Terror” without a “penal code” and outside the “rule of law”, which obviously aroused many 
sensitivities across Europe.
138
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Actually, the plans to invade Iraq evidently pre-dated the September 11
th
 attacks and the 
launch of the so-called “War on Terror”. After the 9/11 attacks, it was quite evident that the 
Bush Administration is keen on seizing the “momentum” and using this “window of 
opportunity” to justify an already-existing policy objective.139 In fact, several scholars argue 
that the Bush Administration was adamant on changing the American foreign policy with 
respect to the Middle East region by moving it towards a more aggressive and escalatory 
approach, based on the premise that this region is both the “key” and the “main threat” to its 
overall objective of maintaining and expanding American hegemony.
140
 As explained above, 
the Bush Administration subscribed to the notion that the United States is entitled to force the 
“liberal world order”, which is the model perceived as compatible with American national 
security, on any nation of the world without regard for notions of national sovereignty.
141
 
Moreover, there was an equally firm belief that resistance to the imposition of this global 
project should not be dealt with only through the traditional conservative approach of 
“containment” but also through “preventative wars”.142 The preventative war on Iraq was 
actually conceived as an essential component of this general hegemonic project put forward 
by neo-conservatives.
143
       
 
However, aside from the noisy rhetoric and ideology surrounding the so-called “War on 
Terror”, it is crucial to look further into the actual motives that made the invasion of Iraq 
such a crucial foreign policy objective for the Bush Administration. This is rather compelling 
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because analysis on the basis of the pure national interest of the U.S. suggests that this war 
should have been far from attractive.  
 
To begin with, the Bush Administration must have been aware that the potential of conflict in 
the Middle East would result in compromising oil price stability, at least on the short term.
144
 
In addition, the United States already enjoyed a significant degree of control over the Gulf 
region and hence over global oil production through a mixture of a strong alliance with Saudi 
Arabia and the “dual containment” of Iraq and Iran.145 Furthermore, rising global demand for 
oil did not threaten American hegemony. In fact, on the contrary, rising oil demand, coupled 
with the unique political and military influence of the U.S. in the Gulf region, actually served 
to cement American hegemony.
146
 Most importantly, a largely depleted Iraq, served U.S. 
interests in a multitude of ways, most importantly by helping contain and check Iranian 
influence, and also by justifying American military presence in the Gulf region.
147
 Therefore, 
from a pure national interest perspective, there is no clear justification for the importance the 
Bush Administration attributed to the invasion of Iraq. This is of course not to mention the 
potential risks to American national interests emanating from the negative reception by the 
international community of such a controversial action, which may have not been fully 
realized by American policy makers at the time they connived of this idea.   
 
In this regard, Raymond Hinnebusch attempts to explain the attitude of the Bush 
Administration towards the invasion of Iraq from a different perspective by analyzing the 
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internal dynamics within the Bush Administration itself. He argues that this policy objective, 
rather than serving American national interests, served the “particular interests of the very 
distinctive ruling coalition” inside the Bush Administration.148 He believes that the election 
of President Bush marked a “power shift” within the United States from a wide coalition of 
the “Treasury”, “Commerce”, “Wall Street” and “mainstream corporate power” to what he 
calls a “much narrower military-oil complex of interests”.149 He adds that rise of George W. 
Bush to power marked the “convergence” of the neo-conservative, Zionist affiliated, lobby 
and the “arms/oil” lobby, especially with regards to policy concerning the Middle East, with 
the arms/oil lobby giving-up its traditional inclination to “appease” Arab oil-rich regimes in 
favor of the more aggressive approach of the neo-conservative lobby.
150
  
 
According to Hinnebusch, the main reason for the convergence of the interests of the neo-
conservative and arms lobbies is their common goal of increasing military expenditure, 
which was evident in their cooperation to move the Regan Administration in the direction of 
starting an “arms race” with the USSR.151 He adds that those two lobbies resumed their 
collaboration in the 1990s in the so-called “Project for the New American Century”, which 
was based on forwarding American hegemony, and increasing American military supremacy, 
while committing to the unconditional support of Israel, and which has as its “centerpiece” 
bringing about forceful “regime change” in Iraq.152 As for the oil lobby, he argues that 
probably the best explanation for its support of this military adventure lies in seeking direct 
ownership and control of Iraqi oil on the one hand, and the short term interest of increasing 
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profits as a result of the increase in the oil prices expected to occur as a consequence of the 
war, on the other hand.
153
 Hinnebusch even argues that the war might have been perceived as 
serving the interests of a wider class of American capitalists keen on reinvigorating the 
American economy through the inflationary effect a rise in oil prices could have on the 
economy.
154
            
 
Hinnebusch also stresses on the key and central role played by neo-conservatives in 
advocating the invasion of Iraq as a central foreign policy objective for the Bush 
Administration. He contends that the neo-conservatives are closely affiliated with Zionism, 
and that they hence place huge importance on preserving the national interests of Israel and 
especially its expansion through settlements.
155
 This policy obviously contradicts with the 
U.S. national interest in preserving its control over oil production, as a balanced approach is, 
therefore, required of the United States with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, in order to 
accommodate the interests of the Arab oil-producing states, especially Saudi Arabia.
156
 The 
United States, while formulating its policy towards the Middle East, sought to balance 
between the interests of Israel and Saudi Arabia, and accordingly was always keen on the 
continuation of the peace process, prompting it to sometimes be critical of aggressive Israeli 
policies, especially concerning the expansion of settlements. The neo-conservatives 
attempted to end the need for such a balancing act through the invasion of Iraq resulting in 
gaining direct access to oil, therefore ensuring American strategic control of the oil market, 
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without requiring the United States to make any concessions to Arab oil-rich states in a 
manner potentially affecting its full and unconditional support of Israel.
157
   
     
Regardless of the plausibility or possibility of the foregoing explanations, it is rather clear 
that the Bush Administration, for reasons that are not entirely consistent with American 
national interests, was adamant on the invasion of Iraq even before the September 11
th
 
attacks and the beginning of the so-called “War on Terrorism”. It is also clear that, in spite of 
the notions of American “exceptionalism” and “unilateralism” pervasive in the foreign policy 
and national security doctrine applied by the Bush Administration, it attempted to exploit the 
September 11
th
 attacks, and the resulting international sympathy with the U.S., to somehow 
justify the invasion of Iraq and gain some measure of legitimacy for this war. Although 
several voices inside the Bush Administration desired for the United States to commence 
operations against Iraq without the approval of the United Nations or the support of NATO, 
President Bush decided to seek the support of the UN, and hence rather than focusing on the 
real policy objective of bringing about regime change in Iraq by force, the U.S. had to justify 
military action against Iraq on other grounds, which prompted the Bush Administration to 
refer to Iraq‟s potential possession of weapons of mass destruction, building on a history of 
Security Council resolutions addressing the issue.
158
   
 
In the beginning, the United States used Iraq‟s refusal to allow the UN Special Commission 
(UNSCOM) weapons inspectors back into Iraq to confirm that Iraq has destroyed its 
weapons of mass destruction as a pretext for the invasion; however, negotiations between 
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Iraq and the United Nations resulted in Iraq announcing in the late summer of 2002 its 
acceptance of the return of the inspectors under the newly formed UN Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC).
159
 It should be noted that the 
UNSCOM inspectors withdrew from Iraq in late 1998 before a four-day US bombing 
campaign launched by the Clinton Administration, which allowed Iraq to refuse their return 
claiming that they were involved in espionage activities.
160
  
 
Nevertheless, and in spite of Iraq‟s announcement of the return of weapons inspectors, and as 
preparations were already underway for the invasion, the United States began discrediting 
UN inspection efforts, which were at the time generally believed to be successful, and as it 
turned out after the invasion were confirmed to have indeed been efficient.
161
 The United 
States was keen on forcing the Iraq issue on the international agenda, insisting that the risk 
that Saddam Hussein would supply terrorists groups with weapons of mass destruction out of 
his arguably still existing arsenal could not be tolerated, and by the summer of 2002, the 
Bush Administration was actively seeking to mobilize the support of its European allies and 
the United Nations for military action against Iraq on those grounds.
162
  
 
When concrete evidence of Iraq‟s possession of weapons of mass destruction appeared 
elusive, the Bush Administration tried to employ another tactic by attempting to link Saddam 
Hussein to Al-Qaida.
163
 This proved to be even a more outrageous attempt that did not 
resonate well with the international community, particularly that the ideological differences 
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between the decidedly secular Hussein and the decidedly Islamist Bin Laden made any true 
potential for such cooperation rather inconceivable.
164
 The Bush Administration could only 
cite the “mutual antipathy” for the U.S. that Iraq and Al-Qaida share to quite lamely explain 
that their cooperation is possible, failing to provide any material evidence of their 
association.
165
  
   
When the issue was actually first discussed in the Security Council in late 2002, France and 
Russia, with the help of other countries, were successful in introducing substantial changes to 
the draft resolution proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom, such that the 
resolution adopted in November 2002 fell short of explicitly authorizing the use of military 
force against Iraq.
166
  With time, it became clearer that the U.S. would launch the invasion in 
spite of the lack of evidence of Iraq‟s possession of weapons of mass destruction or of its 
alleged ties with Al-Qaida, regardless of the absence of a UN cover, and notwithstanding 
opposition from most of the international community, including many of its key allies. 
 
As the U.S. proceeded to obtain international approval of its plans, the European 
governments were split on the issue. The United Kingdom, under Prime Minister Blair, was 
quick to announce its support of the U.S. It was joined by a number of other governments 
that were either right of center and/or ruling nations traditionally “Atlantic” in their 
orientation, such as Italy, Spain, Holland, Denmark and Ireland, and also joined by most of 
the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which relied heavily on the U.S. for their 
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security and independence from Russia.
167
 On the other hand, France and Germany were 
clearly opposed to any prospect of military action against Iraq outside the umbrella of 
international law, and they were supported within the European Union by Belgium and 
Greece, and also joined by the neutral Sweden, Austria and Finland.
168
  The positions of 
France and Germany, which are the most important nations in Continental Europe, the 
central countries in the European Union, and two of the most important allies of the United 
States, merit some closer attention.  
 
With regards to France, President Chirac was firmly supported by the French public opinion 
in his objections to the planned invasion and efforts to justify it.
169
 This position was 
consistent with the French foreign policy objectives based on the premise that international 
affairs should be conducted in a “multipolar” and “multilateral” manner, and that 
consequently the recognition of America‟s prominent role in the international system does 
not mean that the U.S. can ignore international rules and norms.
170
 France is not traditionally 
opposed to the use of force as a matter of principle, and in the Iraq case did not necessarily 
rule out this possibility; however, given the lack of evidence of a clear threat, it was more 
important for France to stress on the importance of legitimacy and international law than 
support its ally.
171
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As for Germany, it appeared clear that the united Germany, now at the heart of the European 
Union, was far more European than Atlantic. As a matter of fact, Chancellor Shroder was 
quite vocal in explicitly opposing the war, stressing that Germany would not contribute 
neither militarily nor economically to the war effort, and even if it was approved by the 
United Nations.
172
 As events unfolded, this position proved to be a decisive factor in the 
German elections held in the fall of 2002, which was closely won by the socialist-green 
coalition he belonged to.
173
    
 
The war was not only opposed by the governments of several key European allies of the 
United States; it was also opposed by the general public opinion throughout Europe and even 
within the countries that officially supported the invasion. For example, according to opinion 
polls, 90 percent of the Spanish population, 87 percent of the Italian population, 79 percent of 
the Polish population and 55 percent of the British population, were against the war.
174
 As a 
case in point, on 15 February 2003, across hundreds of cities throughout the world, nearly 10 
million people took to the streets demonstrating against the then apparently imminent war, 
including about 1 million people in London alone, noting that the United Kingdom was the 
only meaningful ally of the U.S. in the war.
175
  
 
The result of this worldwide opposition was very clear when the United States returned to the 
Security Council seeking UN approval for military action against Iraq. The U.S faced clear 
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opposition from Russia and France, and also by Germany, which was then a non-permanent 
member of the Security Council. Even more notably, six non-permanent members of the 
Security Council, other than Germany (Chile, Mexico, Cameroon, Guinea, Angola and 
Pakistan), opposed the American proposal.
176
 The opposition by those six non-permanent 
members was a true diplomatic humiliation for the U.S. and a crushing blow to its 
international prestige, given that some of those countries are traditionally viewed as falling 
within the direct sphere of influence of the United States.
177
  The historical significance of 
this incident cannot be stressed more, as this was a very rare instance of the United States 
failing to get the United Nations to endorse an action of central importance to American 
foreign policy.
178
 It was the first time in the history of the UN that Western allies of the U.S. 
openly competed with it for the votes of non-permanent members of the Security Council in 
order to ensure an American proposed resolution cannot see the light.
179
 
 
After its failure to obtain approval by the Security Council, the United States announced that 
it would seek such approval for a second time but that it would proceed with military action 
against Iraq irrespective of whether or not a Security Council resolution is passed approving 
such action.
180
 This was an attempt to pressure the international community into accepting a 
resolution, as a compromise, in order to preserve the prestige of the United Nations. This was 
soon met with a retaliatory veto threat not only by Russia but also by France.
181
 The 
threatened French veto is also of significant historical importance, as it is a very rare instance 
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of a veto threat by one of America‟s allies enjoying a permanent seat on the Security Council 
concerning a resolution proposal supported by the U.S. 
 
The rifts between the United States and several of its key allies in Europe were not confined 
to the United Nations, as they also manifested themselves within the NATO context. An 
internal NATO crisis surfaced when Turkey requested the deployment of Patriot missiles for 
its protection from potential Iraqi attacks, only to be met with opposition from France and 
also Germany.
182
 Although the crisis was ultimately averted due to a procedural 
circumvention of the French-German opposition, the extension of the Western divide on the 
Iraq war to the NATO alliance was another setback for American foreign policy.
183
 As 
several key European states solemnly opposed America‟s willingness, under the Bush 
Administration, to act unilaterally and without the approval of the United Nations, they were 
also signaling to the U.S. that NATO can only be used after a European-American consensus 
is built, and that absent such a consensus, America would indeed be forced to act 
unilaterally.
184
 
 
The American decision to almost unilaterally invade Iraq without UN approval, in breach of 
international law, and without the support of NATO and most of its European allies, 
significantly undermined its legitimacy as a leader of the „free world‟, tarnishing its image in 
an unprecedented manner and severely jeopardizing its creditability. This resulted in a 
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crushing blow to America‟s legitimacy and in an unprecedented erosion of American soft 
power.  
 
First, the U.S. was unable to pass a resolution approving the invasion through the Security 
Council, and was met with opposition by seven of the non-permanent members of the 
Security Council, thereby shooting down its proposal without the need for a veto by the 
opposing permanent members. This was a severe blow to American prestige as most of those 
states were developing countries, traditionally assumed to be within the American sphere of 
influence. Second, the U.S. was firmly opposed inside the UN by two of its most important 
allies, namely, France and Germany, that both competed with the U.S. for the votes of the 
non-permanent members of the Security Council, in a truly historic scene. Third, the U.S. 
was faced with the prospect of a French veto of a resolution proposed by the U.S. on an issue 
of central importance to the U.S., again another historic challenge of the American 
hegemonic role. Fourth, as an even more meaningful challenge of American hegemony, 
France and Germany took their opposition of the war to the NATO level threatening in the 
Turkey crisis to defy the United States within NATO itself, hence rocking the foundations of 
American hegemony in the context of transatlantic cooperation. 
 
This highlights the fact that America soft power is tied firmly to the legitimacy, or perceived 
legitimacy, of its actions. The U.S. is not unconstrained in the formulation of its foreign 
policy and national security strategy, and a doctrine based on the notion of American 
“exceptionalism” and “unilateralism” would result in the erosion of American soft power. 
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The U.S., in order to count on the support of its allies or even the countries falling within its 
sphere of influence, must ensure that its actions are perceived as legitimate by the 
international community, and hence America should act within the boundaries of 
international law, and should be engaged in international organizations and regimes. It cannot 
simply force its own vision on the other actors within the international system and global 
economy, as they are both willing and able to defy the United States, if its actions are 
perceived as illegitimate, and the U.S. cannot afford such defiance because it would expose 
the contradictions between American interests and those of other actors, and therefore 
threaten the foundations of the American hegemony based on legitimate domination.               
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V. Conclusion 
 
The United States possesses a considerable degree of structural power in the 
international system and the global economy, as (a) it continues to control or, at least, 
influence the security of many key actors in the international arena, most notably in Western 
Europe, the Far East and the oil-rich Gulf region; (b) as American-based corporations, 
especially in the banking and information technology sectors, dominate the global economy 
and hence dictate the structure of global production; (c) as the United States, through the 
extraordinary position of the U.S. Dollar as a global reserve currency, controls the structure 
of international finance and credit; and (d) as American scientists, inventors, universities, 
research institutions and corporations exert a considerable degree of influence over global 
knowledge and culture.  
 
However, as demonstrated by the War on Iraq (2003) and the events that preceded it, most 
notably the rifts between America and many of its closest allies in the West, the United 
States cannot afford to act unilaterally and outside international regimes and in breach of 
international law. In order to maintain its hegemonic role, the U.S. cannot risk deliberately 
eroding its soft power in the international community, especially vis-à-vis the governments 
and peoples of its closest allies.  
 
To act in a unilateral manner and without concern for the legitimacy, or perceived legitimacy, 
of its actions, America would be planting the seeds for the end of its legitimate domination of 
the international system and the global economy, and would thereby effectively move from a 
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position of integral hegemony, where its interests are aligned with those of most of the other 
actors in the international system, to a position of declining hegemony, where its interests are 
in obvious contradiction with those of several other key actors in the international system 
prompting them to challenge it.  
 
Such change of position, from integral to declining hegemony, will ultimately, and with the 
passage of time, expose the U.S. to serious challenges that, regardless of its obvious 
structural power, it will not be able to meet simultaneously on its own. The potential for the 
loss or decline of American power and hegemony does not therefore emanate from a decline 
in America‟s relative capabilities or sources of power. On the contrary, the U.S. still enjoys a 
unique position in international affairs that it can sustain with its current capabilities 
regardless of their decline relative to the capabilities of other powers or actors.  
 
It is actually the foreign policy of the U.S. that can cement or deplete its hegemonic position. 
A foreign policy that is based on expanding and capitalizing on America‟s soft power would 
preserve American hegemony and make the most of America‟s structural power. Conversely, 
a foreign policy that depletes and destroys America‟s soft power would expose the U.S. to 
challenges that, in due course, would erode its structural power and waste its power 
resources. Therefore, the central debate concerning the longevity of American hegemony 
should actually be a debate on American foreign policy, or on how the U.S. should best 
manage its power resources in the international arena, and should not by any means remain 
an empty purely empirical analysis of the absolute or relative decline or persistence of the 
material indicators of American power.   
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The United States does not need to manage the decline in its power resources because it 
retains a considerable degree of structural power that is enough to ensure its continued 
hegemony. However, the United States needs to realize the limitations of its structural power, 
which allow it a degree of legitimate domination of the international system and global 
economy, if, and to the extent that, American policies are in harmony with the perquisites of 
legitimacy. As such, the U.S. can maintain minimal hegemony in the international system, as 
long as American policies are formulated and applied within a framework that adheres to a 
general policy of cooperation with other key actors within important international 
institutions, especially the United Nations and NATO, and the boundaries of international 
law. American unilateralism, on the contrary, would result in the alienation of America‟s 
allies, especially in Western Europe, and effectively erode America‟s soft power.   
 
Therefore, the U.S., although still enjoying a hegemonic position, cannot operate in an 
unconstrained or uninhibited manner, and should seek to align its interests with those of the 
other key actors in the international system and global economy, or at least avoid any acute 
contradictions between those interests. This is especially important with respect to the 
American allies in Western Europe, as the most valuable source of American soft power is 
the image of America as the rightful leader of the so-called „free-world‟.  
 
The tarnishing of this image by embarking on unilateral foreign policy objectives, without 
due regard to the requirements of meaningful transatlantic cooperation, can potentially end 
the current phase of American legitimate domination of the international system, and not 
necessarily through a united Europe directly confronting the United States, but rather by 
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gradually isolating the United States, denying it resort to the capabilities of its most 
important allies in managing the international system and global economy, and hence 
exhausting its own capabilities and stretching them to the limit.    
 
In the meantime, American policies should not deviate from the normative foundations of 
Western philosophy and culture, in particular placing very high importance on adherence to 
the rule of law in international relations, as otherwise the U.S. would risk exposing itself to 
resistance from many of its closest allies, let alone its adversaries. In order to preserve its 
hegemony, the U.S. must therefore apply a foreign policy doctrine based on clear normative 
values, and seek to uphold those values through cooperation with American allies in various 
international institutions. Those institutions are, therefore, not superfluous by any means; 
rather, they are required to preserve the legitimacy of American foreign policy objectives.  
 
In conclusion, one can safely argue that American hegemony is not on the decline from the 
structural power perspective. To put things simply, America still holds the highest cards in 
the international „poker game‟. However, America must avoid playing the „hand‟ poorly by 
depleting its soft power and undermining the legitimacy, or perceived legitimacy, of its 
actions. It is actually the anxiety over the decline in American power (and the unilateralism, 
isolationism or expansionism this is often translated into in terms of foreign policy) that 
would expose weaknesses in the power base of the U.S.  
 
No matter how strong or dominant the United States might currently be, it cannot unilaterally 
address several challenges to its hegemonic role simultaneously, nor unilaterally confront all 
103 
 
of the problems in the international arena. America needs to cooperate, for example, with 
many actors within the international system, whether close allies or not, in order to prevent 
the horizontal proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and confront the security threats 
of radical Islamist militant groups, in order to manage crises in the global economy, and in 
order to address the threats posed by global climatic change.  
 
Therefore, in order to propel America into a new phase of hegemony, American foreign 
policy should aim at more openness and cooperation with the rest of the world, and more 
engagement in international organizations and institutions, or to use Robert Cox‟s conception 
of hegemony, America should couple its raw material power with norms and institutions to 
achieve true hegemony. In fact, the more the U.S. resorts to brute force or naked power, as 
was the case in the Iraq invasion, the less hegemonic it actually is and the less hegemonic it 
will ultimately become. 
 
As such, the change in the foreign policy outlook of the United States during the current term 
of the Obama Administration, as highlighted in the National Security Strategy of 2010, is a 
step in the right direction, and can begin to restore America‟s position of legitimate 
domination, which it had enjoyed previously, especially after the end of the Cold War, and 
which was somewhat damaged by the Bush Administration, especially as a consequence of 
the decision to unilaterally invade Iraq in 2003. The National Security Strategy of 2010 
actually refers explicitly to themes such as “Strengthen the Power of Our Example”, “Ensure 
Strong Alliances” and “Strengthen Institutions and Mechanisms for Cooperation”, which 
point out to a shift in American foreign policy towards more emphasis on the importance of 
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values and norms, improving American soft power, restoring meaningful cooperation with 
allies, and working through international institutions.
185
 It remains to be seen whether this 
actually marks a change in doctrine or a mere change in rhetoric, and it remains to be 
analyzed how this change, regardless of its nature, is going to affect American hegemony 
within the coming few years.      
 
  
 
             
  
                                                 
185
 Available on http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
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